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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG (GERMAN SUMMARY) 
Täglich werden wir mit einer Vielzahl von unterschiedlichen Entscheidungsproblemen 
und -situationen konfrontiert. Die meisten Forscher im Bereich der Multi-Attribut-
Entscheidungen stimmen darin überein, dass Entscheider ihr Verhalten an diese 
variierenden Umstände anpassen. Die Frage jedoch, wie diese Anpassung erreicht wird, 
wurde auf vollkommen unterschiedliche Weise beantwortet. So nimmt der multiple-
Strategien-Ansatz an, dass Entscheider eine der vielen qualitativ unterschiedlichen 
Strategien auswählen, die in ihrer (mentalen) Werkzeugkiste enthalten sind. Uni-
Prozess-Ansätze hingegen postulieren einen einzigen, uniformen Entscheidungs-
mechanismus, dessen Parameter jeweils angepasst werden. Dieser uniforme Mecha-
nismus wird von unterschiedlichen Ansätzen jedoch unterschiedlich modelliert. Die 
vorliegende Arbeit vergleicht drei Ansätze für Multi-Attribut-Entscheidungen, um 
herauszufinden, welcher von ihnen Entscheidungen auf Basis dargebotener Informa-
tionen am besten beschreiben kann. 
Das erste Projekt (Söllner, Bröder & Hilbig, 2013) konzentrierte sich auf das 
„parallel constraint satisfaction“-Modell (PCS, Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a) für Multi-
Attribut-Entscheidungen, welches den konnektionistischen Netzwerk-Ansatz repräsen-
tiert. Dieser Ansatz postuliert die parallele Integration aller passenden Informationen 
innerhalb einer neuronalen Netzwerkstruktur. Unter Einsatz verschiedener Formate für 
offene Informationspräsentation wurde PCS mit wichtigen Entscheidungsstrategien des 
multiple-Strategien-Ansatzes verglichen. Wenn sich die notwendige Informationssuche 
auf ein Minimum reduzierte, beschrieb PCS das individuelle Entscheidungsverhalten 
am besten. Sobald die Probanden jedoch aufgrund des eingesetzten Präsentations-
formats Informationen suchen mussten, entsprach ihr Entscheidungsverhalten mehr-
heitlich nicht den PCS-Vorhersagen. Somit scheint die Eignung dieses Netzwerk-
Modells zur Beschreibung von Entscheidungen auf Basis dargebotener Informationen 
erheblich von der sofortigen Verfügbarkeit aller Informationen abzuhängen. 
Das zweite Projekt (Söllner, Bröder, Glöckner & Betsch, 2014) stellte dem 
multiple-Strategien-Ansatz den Evidenz-Akkumulations-Ansatz und den konnek-
tionistischen Netzwerk-Ansatz gegenüber, die beide einen einzigen, uniformen 
Entscheidungsmechanismus postulieren. Das Projekt baute auf der Annahme des 
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multiple-Strategien-Ansatzes auf, dass Entscheider, die eine sparsame1 Entscheidungs-
strategie anwenden, Strategie-irrelevante Informationen ignorieren. Die Uni-Prozess-
Ansätze hingegen nehmen an, dass alle relevanten Informationen in den postulierten 
Mechanismus eingespeist werden. Um diese konkurrierenden Vorhersagen zu testen, 
wurde das Informations-Intrusions-Paradigma entwickelt, das Probanden mit validen, 
aber Strategie-irrelevanten Informationen konfrontierte. Im Ergebnis ignorierten die 
Probanden diese zusätzlichen Informationen nicht, sondern passten ihr Entscheidungs-
verhalten (Wahlen, Informationssuche, Konfidenzurteile) konsistent an. Dieses 
Unvermögen Strategie-irrelevante Informationen zu ignorieren passt zu der Annahme 
eines uniformen Mechanismus, der alle passenden Informationen integriert. 
Das dritte Projekt schließlich (Söllner & Bröder, 2014) beschäftigte sich mit 
dem Prozess der Informationssuche und insbesondere dem Stopp-Verhalten, wie es der 
multiple-Strategien-Ansatz und der Evidenz-Akkumulations-Ansatz vorhersagen. 
Dieser zweite Ansatz nimmt an, dass Entscheider Informationen sammeln bis die 
akkumulierte Evidenz zu Gunsten einer Option die individuelle Evidenz-Schwelle über-
steigt und sie die entsprechende Option wählen. Mit Hilfe einer halb-offenen-halb-
geschlossenen Darbietungsform wurden Probanden unterschiedliche Stufen von 
Evidenz zu Gunsten einer Option gezeigt und die anschließende Informationssuche 
wurde beobachtet. Die durchgeführten Analysen stützten übereinstimmend die Vorher-
sagen des Evidenz-Akkumulations-Ansatzes: Aggregierte Analysen zeigten, dass sich 
der Anteil des sofortigen Stoppens mit steigenden Stufen gegebener Evidenz erhöhte – 
ein Befund, der mit dem Evidenz-Akkumulations-Ansatz übereinstimmt, aber für die 
verwendeten Stimuli vom multiple-Strategien-Ansatz nicht vorhergesagt wird. Darüber 
hinaus ließ sich der Abbruch der Informationssuche auf individueller Ebene nicht gut 
durch den multiple-Strategien-Ansatz beschreiben, sondern entsprach der Annahme 
einer individuellen Evidenz-Schwelle.  
Zusammengefasst belegen alle drei Projekte die Eignung der Uni-Prozess-
Ansätze zur Beschreibung von Entscheidungen auf Basis dargebotener Informationen. 
Die vorliegenden Befunde zeigen Schwachstellen des weit verbreiteten multiple-
Strategien-Ansatzes auf, verlangen jedoch gleichzeitig nach weiterer theoretischer 
Entwicklung seiner erfolgreichen Konkurrenten. 
                                                 
1 Der Begriff sparsam, auf eine Entscheidungsstrategie des multiple-Strategien-Ansatzes bezogen, bedeu-
tet, dass die Strategie nur einen Teil der verfügbaren Informationen nutzt (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). 
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SUMMARY 
Every day, decision makers are confronted with a multitude of different choice 
problems and situations. Most researchers in the field of multi-attribute decision making 
agree that decision makers adapt their behavior to these varying circumstances, but the 
question how this adaptation is achieved has been answered in fundamentally different 
ways. Whereas the multiple strategy framework assumes that decision makers select 
one of the multiple qualitatively different decision strategies contained in the decision 
makers’ (mental) toolbox, single-process frameworks propose a single uniform 
mechanism for decision making. The nature of this mechanism, however, is modeled in 
different ways by different frameworks. The work presented in this thesis contrasted 
three frameworks of multi-attribute decision making to determine which one describes 
decision making from given information best.  
The first project (Söllner, Bröder, & Hilbig, 2013) concentrated on the parallel 
constraint satisfaction (PCS, Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a) model for multi-attribute 
decision making, representing the connectionist network framework that assumes 
parallel integration of all applicable information within a neural network structure. 
Varying the format of openly presented information, PCS was contrasted with 
prominent decision strategies from the competing multiple strategy framework. PCS 
gave a superior account for individual decision behavior when information search was 
reduced to a minimum. However, as soon as the format of information presentation 
necessitated some extent of information search, individual decision behavior did not 
comply with PCS’ predictions for the majority of participants. Thus, the adequacy of 
PCS to describe decision making from given information seems to crucially depend on 
the immediate accessibility of all relevant information. 
The second project (Söllner, Bröder, Glöckner, & Betsch, 2014) contrasted the 
multiple strategy framework with the evidence accumulation framework and the 
connectionist network framework that both propose a single uniform mechanism for 
decision making. The project built on the multiple strategy framework’s prediction that 
decision makers employing a frugal2 decision strategy will ignore strategy-irrelevant 
information, whereas the single-process frameworks hold that all relevant information 
                                                 
2 The term frugal, characterizing a decision strategy within the multiple strategy framework, means that 
the strategy makes use of only a subset of the available information (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). 
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will be fed into the proposed mechanism. To test these competing predictions, the 
information intrusion paradigm was developed that confronted participants with valid, 
but strategy-irrelevant information. As a result, participants did not ignore the additional 
information, but consistently adjusted their decision behavior (choices, information 
search, confidence judgments). The observed failure to ignore strategy-irrelevant 
information is in line with the assumption of a uniform mechanism that integrates all 
applicable information. 
Finally, the third project (Söllner & Bröder, 2014) focused on the process of 
information search and, in particular, the stopping behavior as predicted by the multiple 
strategy framework and the evidence accumulation framework. The latter assumes that 
decision makers sample information until the accumulated evidence in favor of one 
option passes the individual evidence threshold and they choose the respective option. 
Participants were presented with varying levels of evidence in favor of one option 
within a half-open-half-closed information display and their subsequent information 
search was monitored. The conducted analyses unanimously supported the evidence 
accumulation framework’s predictions: Analyses in the aggregate revealed that the 
percentage of immediate stopping increased with increasing levels of given evidence – a 
finding that is in line with the evidence accumulation framework, but not predicted by 
the multiple strategy framework for the employed stimuli. Moreover, on an individual 
level, the termination of information search was not well-captured by the different 
stopping rules (currently) contained in the multiple strategy framework, but confirmed 
the notion of an individual evidence threshold.  
In sum, all three projects support the suitability of the single-process frameworks 
to describe decision making from given information. The reported evidence challenges 
the popular multiple strategy framework, but simultaneously demands further 
theoretical development of its successful competitors – the evidence accumulation 
framework as well as the connectionist network framework. 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
When decision makers choose between options that differ on relevant attributes, they 
sometimes seem to rely on one good reason only, whereas sometimes many different 
reasons seem to be integrated into the final decision. The question, how this variability 
of decision behavior is generated, has been answered in fundamentally different ways. 
For example, multiple strategy models assume that decision makers select from a set of 
decision strategies the one that fits best to the specific situation. Other frameworks of 
multi-attribute decision making hold that, instead of choosing between qualitatively 
different strategies, decision makers employ the same uniform mechanism and merely 
adjust its parameters. The nature of this uniform mechanism, however, is modeled in 
different ways by different frameworks. The work presented in this thesis aims to 
empirically contrast the competing frameworks of multi-attribute decision making to 
determine, which one gives the best description of decisions from given information. 
This introductory chapter is organized as follows: First I will give a brief 
introduction to multi-attribute decision making and the focus of my work within this 
research field. After that, the three frameworks relevant for this thesis will be introduced 
and discussed: the multiple strategy framework, the connectionist network framework, 
and the evidence accumulation framework. I will end this chapter by outlining the 
central aim of my work: contrasting the frameworks of multi-attribute decision making. 
The second chapter gives summaries of the articles this thesis is based on, including a 
discussion of each article in relation to the central aim of my work. In the concluding 
third chapter I will give a general discussion and an outlook to future research 
questions. 
1.1 Multi-attribute decision making 
The work reported in this thesis deals with multi-attribute decision making. Here, a 
decision maker chooses between two or more options (e.g., cities), each of which is 
characterized by varying, often binary values for the same set of attributes or cues (e.g., 
whether a city has an international airport, an opera house, an international fair, or a 
zoo). Typically, the cues differ in their relevance for the decision task (e.g., cue 
validity3). Figure 1 shows an exemplary multi-attribute decision task as employed in the 
                                                 
3 A cue’s validity is the rate at which the cue points to the correct (superior) option given that it  
discriminates between the options (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). However, cues can differ on further 
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first article of this thesis (Söllner, Bröder, & Hilbig, 2013). Here, the decision maker has 
to decide which city has more inhabitants (decision criterion) when the option 
“Garango” has a negative cue value for the most valid cue A and positive cue values for 
the less valid cues B, C, and D, whereas the alternative option “Bingo” has a positive 
cue value for cue A and negative cue values for cues B, C, and D. 
 
Figure 1: Exemplary multi-attribute decision task as employed in article 1 (Söllner et 
al., 2013). 
If the decision criterion is a subjective one (e.g., personal preference for a day 
trip), the task is referred to as preferential choice task. A probabilistic inference task is 
characterized by an objective decision criterion (e.g., number of inhabitants, cf. Figure 
1). As empirical similarities suggest similar cognitive processes in both domains 
(Bröder & Newell, 2008; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Todd, Gigerenzer, & ABC 
Research Group, 2012), approaches that were developed for preferential choice (e.g., 
Payne et al., 1993) as well as approaches for probabilistic inferences (e.g., Gigerenzer, 
Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999) are in this thesis subsumed as applying to the 
more general term multi-attribute decision making. In order to zoom in on the research 
                                                                                                                                               
dimensions, for example the discrimination rate (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Thus, some authors 
argued to combine these two dimensions, for example, into a Bayesian validity (Bergert & Nosofsky, 
2007; Lee & Cummins, 2004), success rate (Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999; B. R. Newell, Rakow, 
Weston, & Shanks, 2004), or usefulness rate (Hausmann-Thürig, 2004). 
Frameworks of multi-attribute decision making 8 
focus of my work, I will address two major classifications of research questions within 
this field in the following paragraphs.  
1.1.1 Decisions from memory versus from given information 
In multi-attribute decision making a major classification refers to where the necessary 
information for a decision comes from. Typically, decisions from memory are 
contrasted with decisions from given information (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
B. R. Newell, 2005). The former necessitate that the decision maker retrieves all task-
relevant knowledge from memory, whereas the latter do not rely on the decision 
maker’s long-term memory. Although research has mainly concentrated on decisions 
from given information, decisions from memory have received increasing attention in 
recent years (Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Bröder, Newell, & 
Platzer, 2010; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b, 2006b; Glöckner & Hodges, 2011; Khader, 
Pachur, & Jost, 2013; Persson & Rieskamp, 2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2012, 2013) as it 
has been argued that these two types of decision tasks trigger qualitatively different 
cognitive processes (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; see Platzer, 2013, for a detailed 
overview on multi-attribute decisions from memory).  
The work I will present in this thesis employs decisions from given information. 
This type of decision tasks can be further subdivided into decision tasks necessitating 
external search and tasks that reduce information search to a minimum by “presenting 
all pieces of information simultaneously” (Gigerenzer, Dieckmann, & Gaissmaier, 
2012, p. 244; see also Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b). This distinction becomes evident 
when one considers the two typical applications of the so-called information board 
(Payne, 1976): closed versus open information board. The closed information board 
(often referred to as Mouselab, Johnson, Payne, Bettman, & Schkade, 1989, a 
computer-based implementation) resembles the classic instantiation of this frequently 
employed, matrix-like way of presenting information (see Figure 1). In the closed 
information board, cue values are initially hidden from the decision maker and can be 
acquired in a sequential process, for example, by clicking on the respective box with the 
computer mouse. In contrast, the open information board displays all decision-relevant 
information openly to the decision maker. The work presented in this thesis comprises 
both kinds of decisions from given information: Article 1 employs an open information 
board, article 2 uses a closed information board, and in article 3 a half-open-half-closed 
information board is employed. Thus, in some experiments decision makers have to 
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intentionally uncover initially hidden cue values, but they do not need to rely on long-
term memory to assess the relevant information. 
1.1.2 Prescriptive versus descriptive analyses 
The second classification of research questions, that I would like to emphasize, refers to 
the purpose of analyses. Here, one can either aim to evaluate processes (prescription) or, 
alternatively, to understand and describe them. The former approach questions whether 
a process complies with a normative standard, for example, whether a specific decision 
strategy leads to a high percentage of correct decisions given a certain environmental 
structure (e.g., Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 
2009; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006). However, instead of 
aiming to evaluate a certain process, one can raise the question whether empirical data 
is well accounted for by different models (description).  
The work presented in this thesis focuses on such descriptive analyses of 
empirical data, for example choice outcomes, decision times, confidence judgments, 
and information search. More specifically, it concentrates on the question, which 
framework of multi-attribute decision making (from given information, see paragraph 
1.1.1) describes decision behavior and its underlying processes best. 
1.2 Frameworks of multi-attribute decision making 
For multi-attribute decision making several frameworks (co)exist that make 
fundamentally different assumptions about the decision making process and how it is 
adapted to changing environments and different situations. In this section, I will outline 
three frameworks that apply to multi-attribute decision making4: the multiple strategy 
framework, the connectionist network framework, and the evidence accumulation 
framework. 
1.2.1 Multiple strategies 
The general idea of the models contained in the multiple strategy framework of multi-
attribute decision making (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Payne et 
                                                 
4 As my work concentrates on decisions from given information, I will not address frameworks that 
primarily apply to decisions from memory as, for example, exemplar-based models (Juslin, Olsson, & 
Olsson, 2003; Juslin & Persson, 2002; Persson & Rieskamp, 2009). 
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al., 1993; Scheibehenne, Rieskamp, & Wagenmakers, 2013) is that decision makers can 
access a set of qualitatively different decision strategies – much like a mechanic owning 
a toolbox (e.g., the “adaptive toolbox,” Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) containing different 
instruments. A decision maker chooses adaptively among these strategies the one that 
fits best to the specific situation. This notion inevitably provokes the question, how 
decision makers select the appropriate strategy. Two different approaches to answer that 
question within the multiple strategy framework shall be introduced next.  
Payne and colleagues (1993, see also Beach & Mitchell, 1978) posed that highly 
accurate decision strategies are (cognitively) more costly than less accurate ones and 
thus viewed strategy selection as a tradeoff between effort and accuracy. From this 
perspective, the weighted additive rule (WADD, Payne et al., 1993), that considers all 
cue values for all options and weighs them in accordance to the cue validities, 
represents the “maximum accuracy and maximum effort rule” (Payne et al., 1993, p. 
92). Both Payne and colleagues as well as Beach and Mitchell (1978) addressed some 
task characteristics that should affect strategy selection, for example, time constraints. 
Adding to the testability of the cost-benefit-tradeoff idea, Payne and colleagues 
presented a measurement approach for the cognitive effort associated with a certain 
decision strategy: They suggested counting the number of “elementary information 
processes” (p. 76, see also A. Newell & Simon, 1972) necessary to execute the specific 
sequence of operations as proposed by the respective decision strategy for a particular 
decision problem. 
Gigerenzer and colleagues (1999) built on this work, but questioned the 
aforementioned assumption that decision strategies implying less (cognitive) costs 
inevitably yield lower accuracy. Indeed, comprehensive analyses (e.g., Czerlinski et al., 
1999; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006; Martignon & 
Hoffrage, 1999) showed that fast (not involving much computation, Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999) and frugal decision strategies can be (at least) as accurate as more costly 
decision strategies – depending on environmental characteristics. Gigerenzer and 
colleagues (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Todd et al., 2012) accordingly coined the term 
ecological rationality, implying that decision strategies are not per se (sub)optimal, but 
need to be scrutinized for their fit to environmental structures. 
The multiple strategy framework, and in particular the adaptive toolbox, inspired 
a lot of subsequent research (see, e.g., Bröder & Newell, 2008, for a review on these 
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authors’ extensive empirical work). Especially the prominent decision strategy take-the-
best (TTB, Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) drew a lot of attention (e.g., Bergert & 
Nosofsky, 2007; Bröder, 2000, 2003; Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Bröder & Schiffer, 
2003b; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006; Khader et al., 2013; Lee & Cummins, 2004; B. R. 
Newell & Shanks, 2003; B. R. Newell, Weston, & Shanks, 2003). TTB poses that cues 
are inspected in descending order of validity (TTB’s search rule) until a discriminating 
cue is found (TTB’s stopping rule) and the option favored by this cue is chosen (TTB’s 
decision rule). Thus, TTB involves noncompensatory information integration, meaning 
that a positive value on one cue cannot make up for a negative value on another one. In 
several empirical studies (e.g., Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Bröder, 2000, 2003; 
Hausmann & Läge, 2008; Lee & Cummins, 2004; B. R. Newell & Lee, 2009, 2011; B. 
R. Newell & Shanks, 2003; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), this 
fast and frugal, noncompensatory decision strategy was contrasted with more costly 
compensatory decision strategies (allowing for tradeoffs between cues), for example, 
the equal weight rule (EQW, Dawes, 1979), that ignores relevance differences by giving 
unit weights to the cues, and the aforementioned WADD. From the numerous studies 
supporting the idea of adaptive decision strategy selection, only some shall be presented 
here: Rieskamp and Hoffrage (1999) showed that increased time pressure led to more 
frugal decision making (see also Payne et al., 1993), Rieskamp and Otto (2006) reported 
that choices consistent with TTB increased in a noncompensatory5 environment as 
compared to a compensatory one (see also Bröder, 2003), and Bröder (2000) showed 
that increasing information costs led to more frequent choice behavior consistent with 
TTB (see also Bröder, 2003; B. R. Newell & Shanks, 2003; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006).  
However, the multiple strategy framework also received some critical comments 
– based on (1) empirical findings as well as on (2) theoretical considerations. To begin 
with, critical empirical studies typically concentrated on specific decision strategies, 
most prominent the aforementioned TTB. For example, violations of TTB’s search and 
stopping rule were repeatedly reported: Decision makers purchased more information 
than predicted by TTB’s stopping rule despite high information costs (B. R. Newell & 
Shanks, 2003) and even when the additional cue was objectively useless (B. R. Newell 
et al., 2003). B. R. Newell and colleagues (2004) also reported violations of TTB’s 
                                                 
5 Referring to environments, the terms noncompensatory and compensatory relate to the environment's 
payoff structure - favoring noncompensatory or compensatory information integration respectively. 
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search rule (see also Rakow, Newell, Fayers, & Hersby, 2005). However, it is of 
importance to note that this critique applies to one specific decision strategy only and 
therefore does not affect the general idea of the multiple strategy framework.  
Additionally, the multiple strategy framework faced some critique on a 
theoretical level. One important critique refers to the aforementioned strategy selection 
problem: Although different approaches were made, for example, focusing on the role 
of cognitive niches (Marewski & Schooler, 2011), learning (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), 
and environmental characteristics (e.g., Bröder, 2003; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), the 
multiple strategy framework has not yet comprehensively explained how the different 
decision strategies are selected (Glöckner, Betsch, & Schindler, 2010; B. R. Newell & 
Bröder, 2008). Another fundamental challenge to the multiple strategy framework is the 
question, how the set of decision strategies is theoretically limited (Glöckner et al., 
2010; B. R. Newell & Lee, 2011, but see Marewski, 2010).  
1.2.2 Connectionist networks 
The connectionist network (sometimes also referred to as neural network or parallel 
distributed processing) framework models cognitive processes as passage of activation 
among neuron-like units. Importantly, the connectionist network framework does not 
focus on neural modeling, but is neurally inspired (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). 
The most important components of a connectionist network model are the nodes (or 
units) that are interlinked by weighted connections. As activation spreads in parallel 
through the network, the activation value associated with each node is updated. One 
major distinction between different connectionist models refers to the patterns of 
connectivity (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991): Feedforward networks have unidirectional 
connections, whereas interactive networks have at least some bidirectional connections, 
leading to parallel forward and backward processing across a large number of cycles. 
Most connectionist models count as interactive models (Rumelhart, Hinton, & 
McClelland, 1986) and have gained a lot of interest as they consider multiple 
constraints in parallel (Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997) and settle after a certain number 
of iterations on optimal solutions (Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 
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1986)6. Among these constraint satisfaction models (e.g., Holyoak & Simon, 1999; 
Read et al., 1997; Simon & Holyoak, 2002) one is of vital interest for the work 
presented herein as it was developed for the purpose of describing multi-attribute 
decision making: the parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model for probabilistic 
inferences (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a).  
The PCS model for probabilistic inferences (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a) 
assumes that multi-attribute decision tasks can be represented in a connectionist 
network structure. In the PCS model, options and cues are represented as nodes. These 
nodes are interconnected by bidirectional links that represent the logical relations of the 
decision problem. For example, a positive cue value will be represented as an excitatory 
link between the cue and the respective option. The option nodes are interlinked by an 
inhibitory connection, reflecting the commonly given instruction to choose exactly one 
of the presented options. The network is activated by a general validity node that is 
linked to all cue nodes. These links represent the validity of the cues. Activation spreads 
in parallel through the network which will settle after a certain number of iterations to a 
state of maximized consistency. In this state, one option will be highly (positively) 
activated and therefore chosen by the decision maker (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a). 
Glöckner, Betsch, and colleagues (e.g., Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b, 2012; 
Glöckner et al., 2010; Glöckner & Bröder, 2011; Glöckner & Hodges, 2011) reported 
several findings supporting the PCS model. For example, Glöckner and Betsch (2012) 
showed that adding information in a multi-attribute decision task can decrease decision 
times when the additional information increases the coherence7 in the information 
pattern. This finding was predicted by Glöckner and Betsch’s (2008a) model, but 
contradicts the multiple strategy framework’s prediction that more information 
necessitates longer decision times as more elementary information processes (see 
paragraph 1.2.1) are involved in the process of decision making. The probably most 
                                                 
6 As Bechtel & Abrahamsen (1991) point out, this settling to an optimal solution is no necessity to 
interactive models. Also, these models sometimes settle on local optima instead of the global optimum 
(Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991).  
7 The term coherence refers to the degree of compatibility of the information given by different cues. 
High coherence is achieved when all cues favor one option and speak against the alternative. In 
contrast, if some cues favor one option, but others the alternative one, the information pattern has low 
coherence (see, e.g., Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). 
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intriguing finding supporting the connectionist network framework, however, was the 
demonstration of so-called coherence shifts (e.g., Glöckner et al., 2010; Holyoak & 
Simon, 1999; Russo, Carlson, Meloy, & Yong, 2008; Simon, Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 
2001) – confirming a theoretical prediction derived from the assumed bidirectional links 
in the interactive connectionist network. For multi-attribute decision tasks, the 
coherence shift prediction refers to the posterior subjective cue weights: As cue and 
option nodes are bidirectionally linked, activation flows from cue nodes to option 
nodes, but also from option nodes back to cue nodes. Thus, in the course of consistency 
maximization a cue supporting the superior option will be positively activated, whereas 
a conflicting cue will be negatively activated – leading to an increased subjective cue 
weight for the supporting cue, but a decreased subjective cue weight for the conflicting 
cue. Glöckner and colleagues (2010) reported such a coherence shift: In their studies, 
participants’ subjective (self-reported) initial cue weights were not stable, but adjusted 
to support the favored option.  
However, the connectionist network framework also received some critical 
comments. For the sake of brevity, I will concentrate on two issues that are of particular 
importance for the research on multi-attribute decision making (see, e.g., Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 1991; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986, for a broader discussion). To begin 
with, the connectionist network framework avoids the aforementioned multiple strategy 
framework’s strategy selection problem by assuming that the same uniform mechanism 
is employed across different problems and situations. However, to account for 
individual differences, model parameters have to be adapted. The question how the 
parameter values are selected constitutes a structurally similar problem to the strategy 
selection problem and has not yet been addressed satisfactorily (Marewski, 2010). The 
second issue of importance is PCS’ concentration on the process of information 
integration; Glöckner and Betsch’s (2008a) model does (so far) not specifically address 
the process of information search. Instead, Betsch and Glöckner (2010) put forward a 
component approach proposing that decision makers employ different strategies for 
information search, but a uniform mechanism (i.e., PCS) for information integration 
(see Betsch & Glöckner, 2010; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011, 
for general predictions concerning the interplay of the two components). This approach, 
however, raises the questions (1) what information search strategies are incorporated 
and how they are selected (Marewski, 2010) as well as (2) how this component 
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approach can be put to the test (but see Betsch & Glöckner, 2010, for some 
suggestions). 
1.2.3 Evidence accumulation 
The evidence accumulation (sometimes also referred to as sequential sampling or 
evidence accrual) framework models cognitive processes as sequential sampling 
processes that terminate as soon as the accumulated evidence passes an evidence 
threshold. One major differentiation of model classes within this framework refers to 
the number of accumulators assumed: Diffusion models or random walk models (e.g., 
Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Diederich & Busemeyer, 2003; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff 
& Smith, 2004) assume a single accumulator where positive evidence for one option 
simultaneously means negative evidence for the alternative option. In contrast, 
accumulator models or counter models (e.g., Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Usher & 
McClelland, 2001; Vickers, 1970) assume single accumulators or diffusion processes 
for each option (see, e.g., Ratcliff & Smith, 2004, for an overview). However, for the 
work presented in this thesis, another distinctive feature of the different models is of 
vital interest: The step-size of the models and therefore the (current) field of application.  
The most prominent evidence accumulation models for decision making (e.g., 
Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Diederich & Busemeyer, 2003; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
2008; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001; Usher & McClelland, 2001; Vickers, 1970) 
apply to rapid one-process decisions (e.g., lexical word-nonword-decisions, see Ratcliff 
& Smith, 2004). They share the assumption that the representation of stimuli is 
inherently noisy and to make a decision about a stimulus, a decision maker will 
accumulate successive samples of this noisy stimulus representation until enough 
evidence is obtained to reach the evidence threshold.8 The height of this evidence 
threshold can be adjusted, for example, to account for the importance of a decision and 
the costs associated with sampling additional information (Busemeyer & Townsend, 
1993).  
                                                 
8 Interestingly, some of these models (e.g., Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001; Tsetsos, Usher, & 
Chater, 2010) have been re-interpreted as connectionist feedforward network models with unidirectional 
links. However, within this thesis the term connectionist network (cf. paragraph 1.2.2) refers to the more 
common interactive, parallel constraint satisfaction networks that reach a stable state after a certain 
number of iterations. 
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As multi-attribute decision making from information given9 in a closed 
information board constitutes itself a sequence of simple choice tasks (see, e.g., 
Busemeyer & Rapoport, 1988), evidence accumulation models applying to this whole 
sequence have adapted the step-size of the accumulation process (Hausmann & Läge, 
2008; Lee & Cummins, 2004; B. R. Newell, 2005). In these models, each cue-
acquisition constitutes one step in the proposed sequential sampling process and the 
simple choices themselves – whether or not to search for more information – are not 
subject to the evidence accumulation modeling. Accordingly, the process of cue-wise 
information search terminates as soon as one option gained enough positive evidence to 
overshoot the evidence threshold and is thus chosen. If the threshold is not passed, 
further cue information is acquired until either the threshold is reached or no more 
information is available (and the option with the highest positive evidence is chosen). 
Again, the height of the evidence threshold can be adjusted, for example, to account for 
varying costs associated with the information search (Hausmann-Thürig, 2004; B. R. 
Newell & Lee, 2009). 
The adequacy of the evidence accumulation framework to describe multi-
attribute decision making was documented by several empirical studies (Hausmann & 
Läge, 2008; Hausmann-Thürig, 2004; Jekel, 2012; Lee & Cummins, 2004; B. R. 
Newell, Collins, & Lee, 2007; B. R. Newell & Lee, 2009, 2011). For example, 
investigating the process of information search, Hausmann and Läge (2008) reported 
that decision makers’ stopping behavior was well predicted by the individually 
estimated evidence thresholds and did not correspond to the stopping rules incorporated 
in the multiple strategy framework. This finding is in line with other studies reporting 
information search and stopping behavior inconsistent with decision strategies’ rules (B. 
R. Newell & Lee, 2009, 2011; B. R. Newell & Shanks, 2003). But also studies 
concentrating on choice outcomes as dependent variable found support for the evidence 
accumulation framework. For example, B. R. Newell and Lee (2011) reported that Lee 
and Cummins’ (2004) evidence accumulation model fared best in a model comparison 
including several alternative models derived from the multiple strategy framework. 
However, the (current) evidence accumulation framework to describe multi-
attribute decision making faces some critical issues as well: (1) Just as the multiple 
                                                 
9 For an evidence accumulation model describing multi-attribute decision making from memory see 
Diederich (1997). 
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strategy framework needs to specify how the different decision strategies are selected, 
the evidence accumulation framework needs to explain how the model parameters are 
adapted (e.g., B. R. Newell, 2005). This problem most obviously applies to the 
threshold parameter, but concerns other model parameters as well (e.g., how the cue 
validities are transferred to the evidence scale, see Lee & Cummins, 2004, for one 
suggestion). (2) Related to the first issue, one might criticize that the assumptions 
concerning, for example, information search vary considerably between different 
models within the evidence accumulation framework. For example, Busemeyer and 
Townsend (1993, see also Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007) propose a probabilistic search 
order, whereas Lee and Cummins’ (2004) model employs a deterministic search order. 
Thus, the evidence accumulation framework as a whole is rather flexible and makes few 
strong predictions that can be put to the test. 
1.3 Contrasting the frameworks of multi-attribute decision making  
The aforementioned frameworks maintain a (more or less) peaceful coexistence, in my 
view, mainly for two reasons: (1) Research was often conducted within one of the 
frameworks rather than contrasting them (but see, e.g., Glöckner et al., 2010; Hausmann 
& Läge, 2008; B. R. Newell & Lee, 2011) and (2) the frameworks closely mimic each 
other. For example, PCS can mimic choices in line with TTB, WADD, and EQW 
respectively by adjusting the cue weights in the proposed network (Glöckner, 2009; 
Glöckner, Hilbig, & Jekel, 2014). Evidence accumulation models, to give another 
example, can mimic the limited information search predicted by TTB as well as 
exhaustive search as predicted by compensatory decision strategies by adjusting the 
proposed evidence threshold (e.g., Hausmann & Läge, 2008).  
Due to this mimicking relationship, the different frameworks can often equally 
well account for empirical data and disentangling them poses an “empirical challenge” 
(B. R. Newell, 2005, p. 13). Notwithstanding the complexity of this task (B. R. Newell 
& Bröder, 2008), disentangling the frameworks has repeatedly been advocated 
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2011; B. R. Newell, 2005; B. R. Newell & Bröder, 2008) as 
“‘theory’ accumulation is not a proof for progress” (Glöckner & Betsch, 2011, p. 718) 
and the frameworks do, in fact, “comprise at least partly incompatible assumptions” (B. 
R. Newell & Bröder, 2008, p. 200). 
Therefore, the central aim of my work is to contrast the aforementioned 
frameworks of multi-attribute decision making and empirically determine which one 
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describes human decision behavior best. The aforementioned empirical challenge was 
tackled in different ways, each relying on competing predictions derived from either 
specific model instantiations of the frameworks (Söllner et al., 2013) or the frameworks 
themselves (Söllner, Bröder, Glöckner, & Betsch, 2014, and Söllner & Bröder, 2014). 
Of course, previous attempts have been made to contrast the frameworks (see 
also paragraphs 1.2.2 and 1.2.3), but the question which one describes decision making 
best, has not yet been answered satisfactorily. For example, Glöckner and colleagues 
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Glöckner & Bröder, 2011; Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & 
Glöckner, 2009) found support for the connectionist network model PCS (Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008a) by complementing choice outcome analyses with either decision times 
and confidence ratings or eye-tracking data. As the quoted studies unanimously 
employed the matrix-like presentation format of the open information board, the aim of 
the first article (Söllner et al., 2013) was to test whether this reported dominance might 
crucially depend on this specific format of information presentation. For articles 2 and 
3, previous work was reviewed in a similar, critical vein. For the sake of brevity, I do 
not give a comprehensive review on all the previous work here, but include a brief 
summary of the main critique concerning relevant previous attempts and the 
implemented approach for improvement in the next chapter for each article separately. 
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2 SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES 
In the following sections I will provide summaries of the three articles this thesis is 
based on. For the sake of brevity, I will focus on the main statements of each of the 
articles, as more detailed information can be found in each of the respective articles. In 
excess of the general discussion given in each of the articles, I will discuss how the 
results contribute to the central aim of my work, namely, contrasting the three 
frameworks, and address potential critical issues more comprehensively. An additional, 
general discussion will be given in the next chapter. 
2.1 Contrasting a connectionist network model with decision 
strategy models 
Söllner, A., Bröder, A., & Hilbig, B. E. (2013). Deliberation versus automaticity in 
decision making: Which presentation format features facilitate automatic decision 
making? Judgment and Decision Making, 8(3), 278–298. 
In this article, we aimed to contrast the connectionist network model PCS (Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008a) with three decision strategies routinely investigated within the multiple 
strategy framework: TTB, EQW, and WADD. The rationale for this endeavor was the 
observation that studies reporting a dominance of PCS-consistent behavior (e.g., 
Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Glöckner & Bröder, 2011; Horstmann et al., 2009) 
predominantly employed an open information board. As Glöckner and Betsch (2008b) 
already concluded that sequential information search as induced by a closed information 
board seems to impede the applicability of PCS, we wondered whether behavior in line 
with PCS’ predictions might be even more restricted than that. In particular, we 
hypothesized that PCS-consistent decision behavior crucially depends on the format in 
which the decision-relevant information is (openly) presented. 
As PCS can, in general, mimic the choice outcome predictions of each of the 
considered decision strategies (Glöckner, 2009; Glöckner et al., 2014) and produces for 
the environments employed in this article the exact same choice outcome predictions as 
WADD, the PCS model cannot be distinguished from the decision strategies based on 
choice outcomes alone. However, Glöckner (2009) developed a Multiple-Measure 
Maximum Likelihood (MM-ML) method that estimates a single maximum likelihood10 
                                                 
10 As the models entail a different number of free parameters, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, 
Schwarz, 1978) is employed within MM-ML to control for model complexity (Glöckner, 2009).  
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for each of the considered models based on their predictions concerning choice 
outcomes, decision times, and confidence judgments. For example, WADD predicts 
equal decision times for decision tasks that entail the same number of options and cues 
(and, therefore, cue values) based on the constant number of elementary information 
processes involved – irrespective of the characteristic cue values given in the specific 
tasks. PCS, in contrast, predicts longer decision times with decreasing distance of the 
options on the decision criterion value (Glöckner & Betsch, 2012, see Glöckner, 2009, 
for a detailed overview of the specific predictions). In line with previous work (e.g., 
Glöckner & Bröder, 2011), we used this classification method to contrast PCS and the 
aforementioned strategies in order to test our presentation format hypothesis. 
All three experiments employed the well-known City-Size task (Gigerenzer, 
Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991), presenting it in the matrix-like presentation format of 
the open information board, a newly created map presentation format (conceptually 
following the example of a common city map), and additional variations of both 
presentation formats. Across all three experiments a presentation format effect emerged: 
In the matrix presentation format PCS was the best fitting model, whereas decision 
strategies accounted best for participants’ behavior in the map presentation format. 
Varying the extent of information search within both presentation formats, we observed 
that PCS’ dominance was constrained to the original matrix presentation format – the 
only presentation format that completely eliminated information search (by presenting 
the cues in a fixed order across all trials of the respective experiment).11  
Our results indicate that PCS-consistent behavior is dominant when all decision-
relevant information is highly accessible. As soon as some information search is 
required (as little as it might be), a majority of participants does not comply with PCS’ 
predictions. One possible interpretation of this result is given in the article: The 
perception-like, automatic integration process as proposed by PCS applies only to 
                                                 
11 The original map presentation format necessitated some information search as the relevant cue 
information was distributed randomly across the city area. Varying (i.e., reducing) the extent of 
information search in this presentation format, we restricted the area where each cue could be displayed, 
for example, the most valid cue was only displayed in the upper left quarter of the city area. However, 
this reduced extent of information search in the map presentation format did not eliminate information 
search to the extent that it is achieved in the (original) matrix presentation format. Dominance of PCS-
consistent behavior was neither observed in the original maps nor in the maps with reduced information 
search (nor in the matrices with increased information search). 
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choice situations that conveniently lie out all necessary information to the decision 
maker. If this automatic process cannot come into play, decision makers will resort to 
one of the decision strategies also applicable in this situation.  
In regard to the central aim of this thesis, I would like to discuss two critical 
issues of the reported work: (1) the decision time predictions within the MM-ML 
method and (2) the general approach employed to contrast the frameworks. The first 
critical issue relates to the predictions for the dependent variables by the different 
models in general and the adequacy of the decision time predictions in particular. In 
general, the MM-ML method – as any model fit comparison – necessitates explicit 
model specifications that are, of course, debatable. For example, critics might argue that 
TTB users12 might not base their confidence judgments on the validity of the first 
discriminating cue exclusively (cf. Glöckner, 2009) when further information is openly 
displayed. However, the most severe problem with the predictions employed – also for 
our analyses – concerns the decision time predictions for PCS. These predictions cover 
the process of information integration only, whereas the time necessitated for 
information search is neglected (due to the missing formal model, see paragraph 1.2.2). 
As soon as information search is not limited to a minimum, it adds noise to the process 
of interest (i.e., information integration), making differences – as predicted by PCS – 
harder to detect. Therefore, one could argue that mere noise accounts for the 
presentation format effect reported in this article, as WADD (representing the multiple 
strategy framework) gives the same choice outcome predictions and similar confidence 
judgment predictions as PCS, but does not predict any decision time differences 
between trials. Although we give conclusive arguments in the general discussion of the 
article that this noise interpretation cannot (alone) account for our findings, the issue 
raised is fundamental in respect to contrasting the connectionist network framework 
with other frameworks: Whereas the multiple strategy framework and the evidence 
accumulation framework consider information search and integration, the connectionist 
network framework (mainly) regards the process of information integration. These 
different foci have to be taken into account when contrasting the different frameworks. 
                                                 
12 The notion that a person “uses” a certain decision strategy is a simplification that is employed to 
improve the readability of the text. What it means, essentially, is that the observed behavior of a person 
is best accounted for by the predictions of the respective strategy. 
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The second issue, I would like to address, concerns the general approach to 
contrasting the frameworks. In line with Glöckner and colleagues (Glöckner & Betsch, 
2012; Glöckner & Bröder, 2011, 2014; Glöckner et al., 2014) we employed the MM-
ML method to contrast PCS and several prominent decision strategies routinely 
investigated within the multiple strategy framework. More generally, we contrasted one 
specific model instantiation from the connectionist model framework with other specific 
model instantiations from the multiple strategy framework. One advantage of this 
approach is that it asks for explicit model specifications, but one potential drawback is 
that conclusions may be restricted to the considered instantiations of the model classes 
and may therefore not generalize to the framework level. The following articles 
addressed both issues. 
2.2 Contrasting frameworks I: Multiple strategies versus 
connectionist network and evidence accumulation 
Söllner, A., Bröder, A., Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2014). Single-process versus 
multiple-strategy models of decision making: Evidence from an information intrusion 
paradigm. Acta Psychologica, 146, 84–96. 
In this article, we included all three frameworks of multi-attribute decision making: The 
multiple strategy framework, that proposes the existence of several distinct decision 
strategies, was contrasted with the connectionist network framework and the evidence 
accumulation framework, that both pose a single uniform mechanism to describe 
decision making. Previous work yielding positive evidence in favor of the single-
process frameworks (e.g., Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Glöckner & Bröder, 2011; 
Horstmann et al., 2009; Lee & Cummins, 2004; B. R. Newell et al., 2007; B. R. Newell 
& Lee, 2011) has, just like the work reported in the previous article (Söllner et al., 
2013), regularly concentrated on comparing specific models from the different 
frameworks. We argue that when employing this approach, conclusions may be 
restricted to the considered model instantiations, and therefore advocate testing basic 
assumptions shared by all models within one framework instead. Moreover, analyses in 
some previous work were limited to one specific dependent variable alone (e.g., 
Hausmann & Läge, 2008; Lee & Cummins, 2004; B. R. Newell et al., 2007). To gain a 
broader empirical basis for the framework comparison, we did not restrict our 
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considerations to either information search13 or choice outcomes, but included both (and 
more) dependent variables. 
The basic idea of this article was to test predictions derived from the most 
prominent frugal decision strategy TTB against general predictions derived from the 
single-process frameworks. In particular, we aimed to test whether participants 
seemingly using TTB would actually ignore strategy-irrelevant information as predicted 
by TTB’s famous algorithm: “take the best, ignore the rest” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996, p. 653). As TTB-irrelevant information is not necessarily irrelevant for the 
decision task per se, but only for this frugal decision strategy, single-process 
frameworks predict that this valid information is not ignored. Instead, decision behavior 
should vary contingent on the content of this additional information. 
To test these predictions, we developed an information intrusion paradigm. Here, 
participants had to purchase cue value information in a closed information board, but as 
soon as the first cue value information was intentionally acquired by the participant, 
additional information intruded – boxes opened for free without being clicked on. We 
manipulated the content of the additional, TTB-irrelevant information as being either 
compatible with the option predicted by TTB’s decision rule or speaking against the 
option favored by TTB (incompatible information). As our hypotheses relied on 
(apparent) TTB use, we employed a decision strategy induction procedure (bottom-up 
via choice feedback alone or, alternatively, bottom-up plus top-down via instruction) 
and limited our analyses to (the vast majority of) participants whose behavior during the 
induction phase was best accounted for by TTB. 
The results of both experiments supported the single-process frameworks’ 
prediction that task-relevant information is not ignored, but influences all of the 
investigated dependent variables. In particular, decision makers (seemingly) using TTB 
searched for more information when the TTB-irrelevant intrusions were incompatible 
than when they were compatible with the option predicted by TTB’s decision rule. They 
also refrained more frequently from choosing the TTB option when incompatible TTB-
irrelevant information intruded and were less confident when choosing it.  
                                                 
13 However, as has been argued before, the connectionist network framework (mainly) focusses on the 
process of information integration. Thus, our single-process framework predictions concerning 
information search were primarily derived from the evidence accumulation framework. 
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We concluded that participants seemingly using TTB did not ignore strategy-
irrelevant information, but systematically varied their information search behavior, their 
choices, and their confidence judgments contingent on the content of this “irrelevant” 
information. These unanimous findings on diverse dependent variables support the 
single-process view that applicable information cannot be ignored, but will be fed into 
the proposed uniform decision making mechanism.  
In the article, we discussed two potential objections to the conclusions drawn: 
(1) Participants might have switched strategies between induction and test phase 
contingent on the environmental change (since, on average, the nature of the intruding 
information changed). We believe this interpretation implausible as there was no 
recognizable change in the task structure and appearance, no change in payoffs, a 
consequent reinforcement of using TTB, and some strategy-irrelevant information 
intrusions were incorporated in the induction phase already. Thus, the two phases were 
as similar to each other as possible. (2) Strategy selection was circumvented in our 
paradigm. We answer this objection in two ways: In our approach, the induction phase 
was meant to select an appropriate decision strategy (multiple strategy framework 
interpretation) and our predictions concerned processing after this initial calibration. 
Most participants (seemingly) selected the in terms of payoff successful TTB, but some 
participants apparently selected other strategies. Thus, strategy selection was not 
obviated, but systematically influenced by our manipulation. Additionally, we analyzed 
data separately for the subset of participants that was not additionally instructed to 
adhere to TTB, but learned it bottom-up exclusively. The pattern of results was identical 
for this more natural strategy selection situation.  
In regard to the central aim of this thesis, I believe two further issues should be 
addressed at that point: (1) Although strategy selection was not circumvented in this 
work, our predictions for the multiple strategy framework were only valid for users of 
the induced decision strategy TTB and the experimental logic can only be applied to 
strategies that ignore information. Thus, the framework comparison still rested on one 
specific model instantiation (at least for the multiple strategy framework). As pointed 
out earlier, contrasting basic assumptions of the frameworks without referring to 
specific models might further increase the generalizability of the conclusions drawn. (2) 
Critics might further argue that the intruding information in our paradigm provoked 
demand effects as strategy-irrelevant information was forced upon participants by 
openly displaying it to them. Of course, information intruded right in the beginning of 
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each trial and deviating from the induced strategy was maladaptive in terms of payoff, 
but the reported evidence should be supplemented by findings that do not build on 
participants’ willingness to ignore information given to them by the experimenter. The 
following article addressed both issues. 
2.3 Contrasting frameworks II: Multiple strategies versus evidence 
accumulation 
Söllner, A. & Bröder, A. (2014). Toolbox or adjustable spanner? A critical comparison 
of two metaphors for adaptive decision making. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
In this article, we contrasted the multiple strategy framework and the evidence 
accumulation framework by concentrating on the process of information search and, in 
particular, the stopping behavior as predicted by the two frameworks. Previous work 
(Hausmann & Läge, 2008; Hausmann-Thürig, 2004; Jekel, 2012; B. R. Newell & Lee, 
2009, 2011; Söllner et al., 2014) reported evidence for the adequacy of evidence 
accumulation models to describe information search behavior, but we deemed several 
shortcomings worth tackling in order to conclusively disentangle the two frameworks: 
(1) In contrast to Hausmann and Läge's (2008) approach (see also Jekel, 2012) that only 
compared single cue validities to thresholds, we deemed it crucial to also consider 
combinations of cues as essential part of the evidence accumulation framework. (2) In 
line with Hausmann and Läge, we aimed to estimate an individual evidence threshold 
for each participant. Consequently, the frameworks’ predictions were contrasted in the 
aggregate (B. R. Newell & Lee, 2011; Söllner et al., 2014) as well as on the individual 
level (Hausmann & Läge, 2008). (3) Finally, most of the cited work (Hausmann & 
Läge, 2008; Hausmann-Thürig, 2004; Jekel, 2012; B. R. Newell & Lee, 2009, 2011) 
compared specific evidence accumulation models to specific decision strategy models. 
As discussed before, conclusions based on this approach are in principle only valid for 
the specific models considered. Thus, we aimed to contrast basic assumptions of the 
superordinate frameworks to provide more general conclusions.  
The basic idea of this article was to present decision makers with half-open-half-
closed information boards, openly conveying different levels of given evidence in favor 
of one option. The rationale was that the frameworks differ in their assumptions about 
the termination of information search: According to the multiple strategy framework, 
stopping behavior should comply with the decision strategies’ stopping rules, thus 
predicting distinct patterns of stopping behavior. In contrast, the evidence accumulation 
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framework predicts stopping behavior to be contingent on the extent of (acccumulated) 
evidence and in accordance to the proposed individual evidence threshold. To contrast 
these predictions, we constructed stimuli in such a way that decision strategies’ stopping 
rules would predict the same stopping behavior for each of the investigated levels of 
given evidence – either immediate stopping or continued information search for each 
level. The evidence accumulation framework, however, would predict that participants 
terminate information search contingent on the level of given evidence. In particular, 
the frequency of immediate stopping should increase with increasing levels of given 
evidence.  
We ran three experiments that consisted of calibration phases, that were meant to 
select a decision strategy (or adjust the evidence threshold respectively) based on the 
outcome feedback provided, and test phases that employed the levels of given evidence 
paradigm. Here, we manipulated within subject, how much evidence in favor of one 
option was provided by the openly displayed cues, and monitored the subsequent 
information acquisition behavior. In line with the evidence accumulation framework 
prediction, we found that the percentage of immediate stopping increased with 
increasing levels of evidence – on the aggregate level across all participants as well as 
when running separate analyses for TTB users and compensatory strategy users 
(strategy classification based on calibration phase data). On the individual level, we 
found that for the vast majority of participants (mean percentage across all three 
experiments: 71.5 %) the stopping behavior was best accounted for by assuming a noisy 
individual evidence threshold. 
We concluded that the evidence accumulation framework accounted better for 
the observed stopping behavior than the multiple strategy framework did. It seemed that 
participants applied a much wider range of termination points than implied by the 
different stopping rules incorporated in the multiple strategy framework. Hence, the 
more continuous evidence accumulation account offered a superior description in the 
aggregate as well as on the individual level.  
Anticipating potential critique, we discussed (1) the reasonableness of our 
assumptions and (2) the generalizability of our conclusions, especially to the multiple 
strategy framework. The first issue referred to the crucial assumptions that participants 
did neither switch strategies between calibration and test phases nor, even more critical, 
within the test phases. To briefly reiterate our discussion of the latter assumption, we 
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deemed it reasonable as (1) previous work within the multiple strategy framework 
reported routine effects in decision strategy use (cf. Bröder & Schiffer, 2006a; 
Rieskamp, 2006) and (2) established decision strategy classification methods routinely 
rely on this assumption (e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b; Glöckner, 2009; Payne et al., 
1993). On a more theoretical level, we argued that the notion of a scanning mechanism 
that evaluates for each information pattern whether a certain decision strategy’s 
selection seems worthwhile contradicts the basic idea of a decision strategy as an 
ordered set of processes to solve a task. 
The question whether our conclusions actually generalize to the multiple 
strategy framework arose from the fact that our stimuli were constructed considering 
only some decision strategies (i.e., the most frequently investigated ones: TTB and 
compensatory strategies) and their respective deterministic stopping rules. Extending 
these strategies’ deterministic stopping rules by allowing for random errors to occur did 
not invalidate our conclusions. However, one could argue that the multiple strategy 
framework comprises more decision strategies and stopping rules than considered in our 
paradigm. In the article’s general discussion, we comprehensively addressed the two 
general stopping rules discussed by Gigerenzer and colleagues (2012) and, in particular, 
the “Take Two” heuristic (Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007) that indeed predicts 
continued information search for some lower levels and immediate stopping for the 
higher levels of given information in our paradigm. However, extending our 
considerations to these alternative accounts did not invalidate our findings. We are not 
aware of further stopping rules or decision strategies currently contained in the multiple 
strategy framework that could account for our results. 
However, I would like to extend this discussion to two further issues that relate 
to the central aim of this thesis as well: (1) this article’s focus on information search 
only and (2) the flexibility of the different frameworks. In regard to the first issue, one 
could argue that concentrating on information search predictions alone does not yield 
the desirable broad empirical basis to disentangle the frameworks (see also section 2.2 
for a similar argument). However, I deem the reported concentration on the 
frameworks’ stopping behavior predictions valuable for two reasons. On the one hand, 
evidence accumulation models are basically characterized by the proposition of an 
(individual) evidence threshold. Investigating the adequacy of this essential component 
to account for empirical findings, especially on the eligible individual level (e.g., 
Cohen, Sanborn, & Shiffrin, 2008; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Pachur, Bröder, & 
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Marewski, 2008), constitutes an important step towards the aim to disentangle this 
framework from the multiple strategy framework. On the other hand, the reported 
studies complemented our previous work employing an information intrusion paradigm 
(Söllner et al., 2014) by tackling two critical issues thereof (see section 2.2). In 
particular, (1) demand effects due to (incompatible) information provided by the 
experimenter were excluded by not providing any incompatible information for free and 
(2) the concentration on the frugal decision strategy TTB became dispensable by also 
including compensatory strategies in our considerations. The compatibility analysis (not 
reported so far within this thesis) following our previous reasoning (Söllner et al., 2014) 
showed that participants’ subsequent search behavior was systematically influenced by 
the compatibility of additional information with prior evidence – not only when it 
intruded for free (Söllner et al., 2014), but also when intentionally purchased by the 
participant. These findings were in line with the evidence accumulation framework, but 
not predicted by the multiple strategy framework. 
The second issue, I would like to discuss, relates to the complexity14 (flexibility) 
of the considered frameworks. One might argue that the reported superiority of the 
evidence accumulation framework was due to this framework’s higher complexity, 
allowing for more possible patterns of stopping behavior. Of course, TTB’s stopping 
rule, the compensatory strategy’s stopping rule, and further stopping rules contained in 
the multiple strategy framework are nested within the evidence accumulation 
framework’s stopping behavior predictions for our paradigm. Thus, there are data 
patterns that would contradict the evidence accumulation framework’s stopping 
behavior predictions (e.g., decreasing percentage of immediate stopping with increasing 
levels of given evidence as observed for two participants), but these couldn’t be 
accounted for by the multiple strategy framework either. In my view, this issue certainly 
                                                 
14 A model’s complexity is defined as “the property of a model that enables it to fit diverse patterns of 
data; it is the flexibility of a model” (Pitt & Myung, 2002, p. 422) and constitutes “a key property of a 
model that must be considered by any selection method” (Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002, p. 473). The 
reason for that request is that the “appeal of an excellent fit to the data (i.e., high descriptive adequacy) 
needs to be tempered to the extent that the fit was achieved with a highly complex and powerful model 
(i.e., low parsimony)” (Vandekerckhove et al., in press). This principle is also known as Occam’s razor: 
“Occam’s metaphorical razor symbolizes the principle of parsimony: by cutting away needless 
complexity, the razor leaves only theories, models, and hypotheses that are as simple as possible 
without being false.” (Vandekerckhove et al., in press).  
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is of high relevance (cf. the various approaches to counterbalance goodness of fit and 
simplicity in model selection, e.g., Forster, 2000; Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002; 
Vandekerckhove, Matzke, & Wagenmakers, in press) and necessitates careful 
consideration. In regard to the work presented here, I would like to answer this critique 
based on three arguments: (1) Arguing on a theoretical level, higher complexity in a 
model (or framework) is not disadvantageous per se, but might sometimes be warranted 
(e.g., Scheibehenne et al., 2013). If a simpler model cannot account for highly 
systematic findings, more complexity might yield distinctly improved description 
(goodness of fit). The work reported in this article shows that the stopping behavior of a 
majority of participants is not well described by assuming some distinct stopping rules, 
but better accounted for by the evidence accumulation framework. (2) For the sake of 
generalizability, we contrasted basic framework assumptions instead of engaging in a 
model fit comparison, accepting the drawback of our approach that the complexity of 
the superordinate frameworks cannot (easily) be assessed (cf. Scheibehenne et al., 2013; 
Thagard, 1988). However, within the field of multi-attribute decision making, several 
approaches to model selection, taking into account the complexity of the tested models, 
have been employed (e.g., Glöckner, 2009; B. R. Newell & Lee, 2011; Scheibehenne et 
al., 2013). In line with our conclusions, several studies following such an approach 
found support for evidence accumulation models (Lee & Cummins, 2004; B. R. Newell 
et al., 2007; B. R. Newell & Lee, 2011) – despite punishing these models for their 
higher complexity in comparison to models derived from the multiple strategy 
framework. (3) Arguing about the flexibility of the evidence accumulation framework 
and the multiple strategy framework, it is further of importance to consider that in our 
paradigm the multiple strategy framework’s stopping behavior predictions were 
constrained by design, on purpose. For this paradigm, the multiple strategy framework 
predictions were nested within the evidence accumulation framework predictions, 
leading to the impression that the evidence accumulation framework is – in general – 
more flexible than the multiple strategy framework. However, this relationship is not 
universal. As I have argued before, the complexity of the superordinate frameworks 
cannot easily be assessed (cf. Scheibehenne et al., 2013; Thagard, 1988). But even when 
exclusively concentrating on the frameworks’ predictions concerning the termination of 
information search, assessing the frameworks’ complexity is far from trivial. For 
example, stopping rules relying on a fixed number of cues (Gigerenzer et al., 2012) are 
not nested within the stopping behavior predictions of the evidence accumulation 
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framework. Thus, observing stopping patterns consistent with these stopping rules (in a 
different paradigm, of course) would support the multiple strategy framework and 
would not easily be accounted for by the evidence accumulation framework.  
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3 GENERAL DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
In this concluding chapter of the thesis, I will first give a brief summary of the work 
reported in detail in the previous chapter, before discussing some vital issues arising 
from that work. I will end this first section with a summary of the main conclusions – 
based on the work presented and the subsequent discussion of it. The last section of this 
chapter will give an outlook to future research questions that emerge from the work 
presented in the thesis.  
3.1 General discussion 
The work reported herein is concerned with the question which framework describes 
multi-attribute decision making best. The three articles outlined in this thesis each took 
a different approach to address this question.  
The first article contrasted the connectionist network model PCS with prominent 
decision strategies, aiming at boundary conditions for PCS (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a). 
We observed individual behavior (choice outcomes, decision times, and confidence 
judgments) to be in line with PCS’ predictions when information was highly accessible, 
but more in line with the decision strategies when information accessibility decreased. 
Thus, we concluded that decision behavior consistent with PCS necessitates highly 
accessible information to allow for the proposed holistic processing in a perception-like 
manner.  
In the second article we aimed to contrast the multiple strategy framework with 
the single-process frameworks (connectionist network and evidence accumulation 
framework) based on several dependent variables (most importantly, choice outcomes 
and information search). Employing an information intrusion paradigm, we found that 
participants seemingly using a frugal decision strategy did not ignore intruding strategy-
irrelevant information, but varied their choices and information search behavior in 
accordance with the additional information. These findings were in line with the single-
process frameworks assuming that applicable information cannot be ignored, but will 
automatically be fed into the uniform decision mechanism.  
Finally, the third article contrasted the multiple strategy framework and the 
evidence accumulation framework, based on predictions concerning the termination of 
information search. Employing a half-open-half-closed information board, we presented 
participants with different levels of evidence in favor of one option and found that the 
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stopping behavior (aggregate and individual) was systematically influenced by the 
given evidence – as predicted by the evidence accumulation framework, but not the 
multiple strategy framework for our stimuli. We concluded, that the stopping rules 
incorporated in the multiple strategy framework do not account well for the stopping 
behavior observed in our experiments, whereas our findings comprehensively comply 
with the evidence accumulation framework.  
For each of the three articles, some critical issues were discussed in the 
respective sections of the previous chapter. The present section therefore concentrates 
on an additional cross-article discussion before summarizing the main conclusions of 
the work presented.  
The first issue I would like to address refers to the status of PCS: Does PCS 
replace or complement the multiple strategy framework? In the first article (Söllner et 
al., 2013) we argued that automatic decision making as proposed by PCS may be 
limited to specific situations – that is, when information is highly accessible, enabling a 
perception-like, automatic processing of the whole information pattern (see also 
Gigerenzer et al., 2012). If the proposed connectionist network cannot immediately be 
set up, decision makers have to employ (other) decision strategies. This interpretation of 
PCS as an automatic decision strategy complementing the multiple strategy 
framework15, however, is not in line with Glöckner and Betsch’s (Betsch & Glöckner, 
2010; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a; Glöckner et al., 2010) conception of PCS as 
constituting a single-process model aiming to replace the multiple strategy framework. 
However, for PCS (or the component model, Betsch & Glöckner, 2010, see also 
paragraph 1.2.2) to replace the multiple strategy framework, the process of information 
search has to be formally modeled in addition to the present model of information 
integration. Whether such a comprehensive model could account for the empirical 
                                                 
15 As we have argued in the first article (Söllner et al., 2013), this interpretation is actually implied by 
employing the MM-ML classification method developed by Glöckner (2009; Jekel, Nicklisch, & 
Glöckner, 2010): PCS is not contrasted with the multiple strategy framework as a whole, but added as 
alternative model in a strategy classification method that is based on work within the multiple strategy 
framework (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003a). The result of this method necessarily entails a certain 
percentage of participants classified as most probably adhering to some of the prominent decision 
strategies and a certain percentage of participants whose behavior is best accounted for by PCS. Thus, 
some decision makers seem to rely on automatic decision making whereas others select one of the other 
decision strategies.  
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findings reported in the first article (Söllner et al., 2013) currently remains, 
unfortunately, an open question. For the second article (Söllner et al., 2014), we derived 
basic predictions from the connectionist network framework (based on the information 
integration process formally modeled), thus interpreting PCS as the single-process 
model it was originally proposed to be. 
The second central issue I would like to discuss emerges from the work 
presented in the second article (Söllner et al., 2014): What does it mean if decision 
makers do not ignore “irrelevant” information? Employing an information intrusion 
paradigm in the second article, we found that decision makers seemingly employing a 
frugal decision strategy did not ignore strategy-irrelevant information that was given to 
them for free and without being intentionally acquired. The finding that when 
encountering incompatible irrelevant information decision makers invest more 
resources (in terms of information costs) even though that purchase does not pay overall 
(the frugal decision strategy yielded the highest payoff) is intriguing. Moreover, the 
work reported in the third article (Söllner & Bröder, 2014) demonstrates that this failure 
to ignore additional information is not limited to the case of intruding information that 
might be criticized for evoking demand effects (see section 2.2), but holds for 
intentionally acquired information as well. These findings support the notion of a single 
uniform mechanism for decision making that incorporates all applicable information – 
as assumed by the connectionist network framework as well as the evidence 
accumulation framework. This conclusion concurs with Bröder and Newell’s (2008) 
conclusion that the integration of information does not seem to be as costly as assumed 
by the multiple strategy framework. In line with our findings, recent studies have 
gathered further support for the idea of automatic information integration within a 
uniform mechanism (Betsch, Lang, Lehmann, & Axmann, 2014; Dorrough, Glöckner, 
Betsch, & Wille, 2014). 
Before giving an outlook to future research questions, I would like to summarize 
my main conclusions drawn from the work presented herein: (1) Automatic 
(compensatory) information integration can be observed for multi-attribute decisions 
from given information, when information search is reduced to a minimum (Söllner et 
al., 2013). This conclusion concurs with Gigerenzer and colleagues’ (2012) conjecture 
that “If an experiment eliminates search by presenting all pieces of information 
simultaneously, participants may readily perform some cognitive integration of all or 
most of the cues presented” (p. 244). Interestingly, according to our results, 
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simultaneous presentation of information (as also assumed by Glöckner & Betsch, 
2008b) is not sufficient: Information search has to be reduced to a minimum. The 
question, however, which framework accounts best for decisions from given 
information that necessitate information search, was not central to this investigation 
(Söllner et al., 2013) and cannot be answered based on the data collected. In the article 
we argued in favor of the multiple strategy framework, but the data patterns might 
equally well be accounted for by a further specified component model (Betsch & 
Glöckner, 2010) or by an evidence accumulation account respectively. (2) Decision 
makers do not ignore additional information, but seem to automatically integrate it as 
they vary their behavior (choice outcomes, information search, confidence judgments) 
in accordance to its content. This finding does not comply with the notion of selecting a 
certain decision strategy to be continuously employed for a specific task (multiple 
strategy framework), but supports the idea of a single uniform mechanism as proposed 
by the connectionist network framework16 and the evidence accumulation framework. 
(3) Stopping behavior is dependent on the level of evidence given and inter-individually 
diverse – much more than predicted by the stopping rules (currently) incorporated in the 
multiple strategy framework. This finding lends further support to the adequacy of the 
evidence accumulation framework to describe multi-attribute decision making. 
3.2 Outlook  
I would like to conclude this thesis with an outlook to future research questions. The 
first suggestions are most directly related to the work presented herein, concentrating on 
the adequacy of the different frameworks to describe multi-attribute decision making 
from given information. The concluding ones broaden the focus to briefly address the 
initially excluded adjacent research areas in multi-attribute decision making: decisions 
from memory and prescriptive analyses. 
Especially the articles contrasting the different frameworks of multi-attribute 
decision making (Söllner et al., 2014, and Söllner & Bröder, 2014) suggest that the 
multiple strategy framework cannot (easily) account for some empirical findings and 
might therefore offer a too simple description of human decision making. However, the 
alternative frameworks superiorly accounting for the empirical data necessitate 
                                                 
16 Note, however, that information search predictions are rather difficult to derive for the connectionist 
network framework as the process of information search is not formally modeled. 
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theoretical development in (at least) two directions: (1) The process of information 
search is not formally modeled within PCS – the model representing the connectionist 
network framework of multi-attribute decision making. I believe that extending PCS to 
formally model the links between the information integration connectionist network and 
the deliberate information search strategies (as assumed by the component model, 
Betsch & Glöckner, 2010) constitutes an essential next step to further disentangle the 
different frameworks. (2) The evidence accumulation framework accounted very well 
for the empirical data presented herein. An essential next step within this framework 
mirrors the strategy selection problem discussed for the multiple strategy framework: 
The question, how the parameter values are adapted, has to be answered. Of course, 
some work in this direction has been done already (e.g., Hausmann-Thürig, 2004; B. R. 
Newell & Lee, 2009) and some ideas developed within the multiple strategy framework 
can probably be transferred to the evidence accumulation framework (e.g., concerning 
the role of learning, Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Nonetheless, further research is needed to 
comprehensively address this current shortcoming. Furthermore, it will be important to 
also disentangle the connectionist network framework and the evidence accumulation 
framework (see, e.g., Glöckner, Heinen, Johnson, & Raab, 2012; Tsetsos, Usher, & 
Chater, 2010) – as in the work presented in this thesis the multiple strategy framework 
constituted the comparison standard for each of the alternative frameworks. 
In a broader sense, one might consider two further vital research areas within 
multi-attribute decision making (see paragraphs 1.1.1 and 1.1.2) as potentially 
promising for future investigations: decisions from memory and prescriptive analyses. 
Multi-attribute decisions from memory have, for example, recently been addressed by 
Platzer (2013), concentrating on the multiple strategy framework and exemplar-based 
models (Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003; Juslin & Persson, 2002; Persson & Rieskamp, 
2009). In her work, however, Platzer complemented the multiple strategy framework 
with exemplar-based decision making (cf. the discussion on PCS’ status in relation to 
the multiple strategy framework, section 3.1). Shifting the focus to a framework 
comparison and broadening it to also include connectionist network models (Glöckner 
& Bröder, 2014; Glöckner & Hodges, 2011) and evidence accumulation models (e.g., 
Diederich, 1997) constitutes an important research topic that has not been addressed so 
far. One reason for this shortcoming is evident: The empirical challenge encountered 
when aiming to disentangle the frameworks for decisions from given information might 
seem negligible when switching to decisions from memory. Still, maybe novel 
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approaches to trace information search in memory (e.g., Khader et al., 2013; Renkewitz 
& Jahn, 2012, but see also Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007) or clever research paradigms (as 
I hope to have presented in this thesis) will contribute to successfully tackle this 
immense empirical challenge in the future. 
Interestingly, the prescriptive aspect of multi-attribute decision making, in my 
view, does not need extensive additional work in regard to the introduced frameworks. 
Within the multiple strategy framework, the adaptive toolbox approach (Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999) constituted a vital development by arguing (and showing) that simple 
heuristics can be (at least) as accurate as more complex decision strategies (e.g., 
Czerlinski et al., 1999; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006; Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999). The underlying idea of 
adaptation to environmental characteristics, however, is not universal to the multiple 
strategy framework, but (potentially) also part of connectionist network models and 
evidence accumulation models (see, e.g., Glöckner et al., 2014) that can adjust their 
parameters adaptively. As has been argued before, the question how these parameters 
are adjusted constitutes a theoretical challenge for the single-process frameworks just as 
the strategy selection problem continues to challenge the multiple strategy framework. 
In sum, the work presented in this thesis aimed to contrast different frameworks 
of multi-attribute decision making from given information. The empirical challenge 
emerging from the mimicking relationship between the multiple strategy framework and 
the single-process frameworks was tackled in different ways in this thesis’ three articles. 
The reported superiority of the single-process frameworks to describe decision behavior 
in multi-attribute decision tasks challenges the popular multiple strategy view, but at the 
same time demands further theoretical development of the single-process frameworks. 
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Abstract 
For multi-attribute decision tasks different metaphors exist that describe the process of 
decision making and its adaptation to diverse problems and situations. Multiple-
strategy-models (MSMs) assume that decision makers choose adaptively from a set of 
different strategies (toolbox metaphor), whereas evidence accumulation models (EAMs) 
hold that a uniform mechanism is employed, but adapted to the environmental change 
(adjustable spanner metaphor). Despite recent claims that the frameworks are hard to 
disentangle empirically, both metaphors make distinct predictions concerning the 
information acquisition behavior – namely, that search is terminated according to the 
selected strategy (MSMs) or that information is acquired until an evidence threshold is 
passed (EAMs). In three experiments, we contrasted these predictions by providing 
participants with different degrees of evidence in a half-open-half-closed information 
board. For the majority of participants we find that their stopping behavior is well 
captured by the notion of an evidence threshold that is either undercut or passed by the 
given evidence. 
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1 Introduction 
When choosing between multiple options, decision makers sometimes rely on one good 
reason only and sometimes they search for a lot of arguments before making their 
decision. Observing these adaptations, one can conclude that humans employ different 
decision strategies in different situations (toolbox metaphor, e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd, & 
ABC Research Group, 1999; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). But the behavioral 
changes can also be explained by assuming that a uniform mechanism is used – with its 
input adapted to the situation at hands (adjustable spanner metaphor, e.g., Lee & 
Cummins, 2004; Newell, 2005). These two metaphors or frameworks of decision 
making coexist – primarily, because they are both able to account for the vast majority 
of empirical findings, but also because they are hard to disentangle empirically (Jekel, 
2012; Newell, 2005; Newell & Bröder, 2008). In the current paper, we concentrate on 
predictions from the two frameworks concerning the termination of information 
acquisition and contrast them in a novel paradigm that systematically varies the level of 
given evidence.  
The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows: First, we introduce the 
aforementioned two frameworks of decision making in more detail. We then address the 
question why disentangling these coexisting approaches poses an “empirical challenge” 
(Newell, 2005, p. 13) and give a brief overview of recent attempts to tackle this 
challenging task. Finally, we introduce a novel paradigm that enables us to contrast the 
two frameworks by concentrating on their predictions concerning the termination of 
information acquisition under varying levels of given evidence. This paradigm 
constitutes the basis for the three experiments reported and discussed in the remainder 
of this article.  
1.1 Two frameworks of decision making 
The two frameworks we will describe in turn address multi-attribute decision tasks. 
Here, decision makers have to choose among two or more options (e.g., potential oil 
drilling sites) the one that scores highest on a certain criterion (e.g., quantity of 
contained oil). As decision aids, attributes (or cues) that evaluate the options can be 
consulted (e.g., a chemical analysis yielding a positive or negative evaluation), and each 
cue has some validity in reference to the decision criterion (e.g., a validity of .80 means 
that in eight out of ten cases where the chemical analysis discriminates, it favors the site 
that actually contains the most oil). If the criterion is an objective one (e.g., the quantity 
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of oil), the task is referred to as probabilistic inference, whereas a subjective criterion 
(e.g., preference for a day trip) characterizes a preferential choice task. As empirical 
similarities suggest similar cognitive processes in both domains (Bröder & Newell, 
2008; Payne et al., 1993; Todd, Gigerenzer, & ABC Research Group, 2012) we do not 
address them separately, but subsume both under the more general term multi-attribute 
decision tasks.  
In the laboratory, multi-attribute decision tasks are regularly presented in a matrix-
like presentation format, called information board (Payne, 1976; Payne et al., 1993). To 
trace the process of information acquisition, closed information boards initially hide the 
cue values and participants have to intentionally acquire the information of interest 
before making a decision. 
1.1.1 Multiple-strategy models 
One well-established framework for multi-attribute decision making is the toolbox 
metaphor. Despite differences in other assumptions, the various multiple-strategy 
models (MSMs, e.g., Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Payne et al., 
1993; Scheibehenne, Rieskamp, & Wagenmakers, 2013) in unison assume that decision 
makers are equipped with a set of distinct decision strategies – much like the numerous 
special tools contained in a toolbox (e.g., the “adaptive toolbox”, Gigerenzer & Todd, 
1999). Decision makers adaptively select the most appropriate one contingent on the 
current situation (e.g., Marewski & Schooler, 2011; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006).  
Decision strategies can be described by three rules: a search rule, a stopping rule, and 
a decision rule (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). For example, the prominent “take-the-best” 
heuristic (TTB, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991) holds that a decision 
maker searches information along the cue validity hierarchy starting with the most valid 
cue (TTB's search rule). The decision maker stops information acquisition as soon as a 
cue discriminates between the options (TTB's stopping rule) and chooses the option 
supported by the respective cue (TTB's decision rule). As TTB often uses only a subset 
of the available and applicable information (so-called frugality, Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1999) and bases the decision on one valid cue alone (noncompensatory 
decision making) it is typically contrasted with compensatory decision strategies that 
use all available information and involve tradeoffs between cues (e.g., Bergert & 
Nosofsky, 2007; Bröder, 2000, 2003; Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Bröder & Schiffer, 
2003b, 2006a, 2006b; Dieckmann, Dippold, & Dietrich, 2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
 Toolbox or spanner - A critical comparison 
5 
1999; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell & Lee, 2009, 2011; Rieskamp, 2006; Rieskamp 
& Otto, 2006; Scheibehenne et al., 2013). This competing class of compensatory 
decision strategies includes strategies that weigh the cues according to their validities 
(e.g., the weighted additive rule, WADD, Payne et al., 1993, or Franklin’s rule, 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999), but also strategies that give unit weights to the cues 
(e.g., the equal weight rule, EQW, Dawes, 1979; Payne et al., 1993, or Dawes’s rule, 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). Although the aforementioned decision strategies gained 
by far the most attention, the number of proposed strategies exceeds this selection 
considerably (e.g., Payne et al., 1993; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; Svenson, 1979). 
The bottom line of the toolbox metaphor is that each decision strategy or heuristic can 
be characterized as a set of production rules that govern search, stopping, and choice. 
1.1.2 Single-process models 
The “single-process models” (SPMs, e.g., Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004; Busemeyer & 
Townsend, 1993; Hausmann & Läge, 2008; Lee & Cummins, 2004) constitute a 
framework that is summarized by Newell’s (2005, p. 13) “adjustable spanner” 
metaphor: SPMs assume that instead of selecting one from several distinct decision 
strategies, decision makers employ the same uniform decision making mechanism in 
every situation. They adapt this universal tool to the current situation – much like 
widening and narrowing the jaws of an adjustable spanner (Newell & Lee, 2009).  
Within the framework of SPMs, several classes of models exist. Connectionist 
models, for example, assume that the decision problem is represented in a neural 
network that captures all decision-relevant information. Activation spreads in parallel 
through the network until a stable state of maximized consistency is reached and the 
option with the highest positive activation is chosen (parallel constraint satisfaction 
networks, e.g., Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Simon & Holyoak, 2002; Thagard & 
Millgram, 1995). As connectionist models currently focus on the process of information 
integration, but do (so far) not specifically model the process of information acquisition 
(but see Betsch & Glöckner, 2010; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011, for general predictions 
of PCS concerning information search), we do not further address this model class in 
the current paper.  
Another prominent class of SPMs that models the process of information search is 
called evidence accumulation models (EAMs, e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; 
Hausmann & Läge, 2008; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell, 2005). EAMs assume a 
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sequential sampling process that terminates as soon as the accumulated evidence passes 
an evidence threshold.1 Although models from this class have successfully been applied 
to simple choice tasks (see, e.g., Krajbich, Lu, Camerer, & Rangel, 2012; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008) and their application to multi-attribute decision tasks seems 
straightforward (Newell & Lee, 2011), only few models aim to capture the sequential 
information search usually investigated for multi-attribute decision tasks (but see, e.g., 
Diederich, 1997). The obvious reason for this shortcoming is that a multi-attribute 
decision task with hidden cue information (e.g., using a closed information board) 
constitutes a sequence of simple choice tasks (see, e.g., Busemeyer & Rapoport, 1988) – 
that is whether or not to uncover further cue information. In order to describe such a 
multi-attribute decision task by a single evidence accumulation model, we deem it 
helpful to adapt the step-size of the model from, for example, attention shifts (e.g., 
Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) to the acquisition of a whole cue. Lee and Cummins 
(2004) developed such a model that assumes cue-wise information search along the cue 
validity hierarchy and termination of the sequential sampling process when either (1) 
the combined log-odds values of the so far sampled cues pass the threshold or (2) all 
cues have been sampled. Hausmann and Läge (2008) presented a model that predicts 
the termination of the sequential search process if the validity of the first discriminating 
cue corresponds to or lies above the individual confidence threshold. Their model 
remains unspecified in terms of information integration. Both models motivated 
empirical tests and some of this work will be addressed in the next section. 
1.2 How to distinguish between the two frameworks? 
The coexistence of the different frameworks (SPMs assuming a flexible, uniform 
mechanism and MSMs proposing a toolbox containing several qualitatively different 
                                                 
1 Two subclasses of these sequential sampling models exist: (1) Diffusion models or random walk models 
(e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Diederich & Busemeyer, 2003; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Smith, 
2004) assume a single accumulator where positive evidence for one option simultaneously means 
negative evidence for the alternative option. (2) Accumulator models or counter models (e.g., Ratcliff & 
Smith, 2004; Usher & McClelland, 2001; Vickers, 1970) assume single accumulators or diffusion 
processes for each option. To discuss these subclasses in more detail is beyond the scope of this paper 
(but see Ratcliff & Smith, 2004, for an overview). However, we took care that our paradigm in principle 
applies to both subclasses by providing only negative evaluations as non-discriminating evidence in the 
test phase of our experiments. This should not affect diffusion models and accumulator models 
differentially as no evidence in favor of either option is conveyed. 
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mechanisms) has been deemed unsatisfactory (Glöckner & Betsch, 2011). However, it 
is consequential as it has been argued that the frameworks are hard to disentangle 
empirically due to their ability to mimic each other (Newell, 2005; Newell & Bröder, 
2008). For example, behavior in line with TTB (MSM view) can be reinterpreted as 
evidence accumulation with a low evidence accumulation threshold (EAM view) and 
vice versa. In both interpretations, the decision maker stops information search as soon 
as the first discriminating cue is found and chooses the option favored by this cue. The 
use of compensatory decision strategies (MSM view) corresponds to evidence 
accumulation with a high evidence accumulation threshold (EAM view). Here, 
information search only stops when many or all available pieces of information have 
been inspected and the option is chosen that received more positive evidence.  
1.2.1 Recent attempts to disentangle the two frameworks 
In recent years, there have been some attempts to disentangle the two frameworks (see 
Söllner, Bröder, Glöckner, & Betsch, 2014, for a short overview). As the current paper 
focuses on information acquisition and, in particular, the termination of it, we 
concentrate our following critical overview on studies that addressed this dependent 
variable.  
Hausmann and Läge (2008) contrasted their evidence accumulation model with the 
MSM prediction that decision makers either stick with one-reason decision making (as 
predicted by TTB) or more-reason decision making (as predicted by compensatory 
strategies). In two experiments they showed that their participants’ stopping behavior 
was well captured by assuming an individual confidence threshold, but was only rarely 
in line with the MSM prediction. In particular, Hausmann and Läge’s participants 
terminated information search when the validity of the first discriminating cue overshot 
the estimated individual confidence threshold and went on to search for information 
when its validity undershot this “desired level of confidence” (Hausmann & Läge, 
2008). Manipulating the relative information cost per cue within subject, Hausmann-
Thürig (2004) further showed that participants adapted their individual confidence 
threshold (according to Hausmann & Läge’s model): Low relative information costs led 
to higher thresholds than high relative information costs.  
In our view, this line of research concentrating on Hausmann and Läge’s (2008) 
evidence accumulation model provided interesting and valuable support for the notion 
of evidence-based stopping behavior. Especially their consideration of individual (as 
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opposed to aggregated) data constitutes an eligible analysis (e.g., Cohen, Sanborn, & 
Shiffrin, 2008; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Pachur, Bröder, & Marewski, 2008). 
However, we argue that the concentration on solely the first discriminating cue 
(Hausmann & Läge, 2008; Hausmann-Thürig, 2004; Jekel, 2012), missed out a vital 
component of EAMs: the accumulation of several pieces of evidence (see also Jekel, 
2012, for a similar argument).  
The evidence accumulation model put forward by Lee and Cummins (2004) assumes 
that the log-odds values of the sampled cues are summed up sequentially, yielding 
evidence in favor of either one of two obtainable options. Newell and Lee (2009, 2011) 
investigated the stopping behavior as predicted by this model. Newell and Lee (2009) 
monitored the stopping behavior in dependence on environmental changes (i.e., whether 
a compensatory strategy had higher predictive performance than TTB or not). They 
found that participants adapted the number of cues acquired to these changes – on an 
individual level as well as in the aggregate. Newell and Lee reflected that the 
inconsistency of this finding with previous work based on choice outcome analyses 
showing inertia effects (Rieskamp, 2006) and strategy routines (Bröder & Schiffer, 
2006a) suggests that analyzing the “the amount of evidence accumulated […] increases 
the likelihood of observing adaptation” (2009, p. 477). Thus, Newell and Lee (2011) did 
not only consider choice outcomes in a model fit comparison (see, e.g., Söllner et al., 
2014, for a short summary), but extended their investigations (in Experiment 2) to 
participants’ stopping behavior. Building on Lee and Cummins’ (2004) model, they 
computed the mean level of evidence at which participants consistently choosing the 
TTB option and participants consistently choosing the alternative (compensatory) 
option terminate information search. They found that this threshold proxy significantly 
differed between these extreme groups – a finding that is well in line with the 
aforementioned mimicking relationship between the two frameworks (MSMs and 
EAMs). This approach to assessing the height of the assumed evidence accumulation 
threshold constituted a valuable further step towards disentangling MSMs and EAMs. 
However, we believe that Newell and Lee’s (2011) approach – although yielding 
essential findings – entails some weaknesses. Firstly, their results need to be interpreted 
carefully as the experiment entailed a cue validity learning phase that could result in an 
incorrect subjective cue validity hierarchy (cf. Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Newell & 
Lee, 2011). Therefore, the subjective cue weights could substantially differ from the 
objective cue validities, constituting the basis for the threshold assessment. Moreover, 
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the threshold assessment was based on aggregated data, rather than estimating an 
individual evidence threshold for each participant. In our view, this should be the next 
step towards disentangling MSMs and EAMs.  
Both research lines presented so far (concentrating on either Hausmann and Läge’s 
model or Lee and Cummins’ model) compared specific models of evidence 
accumulation to specific decision strategy models, instead of aiming at the more general 
frameworks. Therefore, the conclusions drawn were in principle only valid for the 
specific models considered and not easily generalizable to model classes and 
frameworks. In a recent paper (Söllner et al., 2014), we tried to overcome this drawback 
by concentrating on basic predictions derived from MSMs and SPMs (covering EAMs 
and connectionist models). The basic idea was to test, whether participants apparently 
using a frugal decision strategy do actually confirm to this decision strategy’s 
production rules or, alternatively, behave more in line with SPMs’ predictions. For this 
aim, we induced TTB-consistent behavior (e.g. via extensive training in a task with 
strictly noncompensatory payoff) and investigated, whether participants who had 
successfully undergone this induction procedure ignored freely available TTB-irrelevant 
information as predicted by TTB’s famous algorithm “take the best, ignore the rest” 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, p. 653). In two experiments, we found that participants 
did not ignore this freely available extra information, but adapted their behavior to its 
compatibility with the TTB-relevant information. In regard to information search we 
observed that participants searched for more information when the extra information 
was incompatible (weakening the TTB-option favored by the most valid discriminating 
cue) than when it supported the TTB-option (compatible information). This finding was 
predicted by EAMs, but not easily accounted for by MSMs. Thus, we concluded that 
SPMs offer a better account for the observed behavioral data than MSMs can. 
However, we believe that two disadvantages of this former approach need to be 
tackled in order to substantiate this conclusion: (1) The information intrusion paradigm 
(Söllner et al., 2014) entailed that in a closed information board certain pieces of 
information were opened for free without being intentionally uncovered by the decision 
maker. Critiques might argue that demand effects caused the decision makers to attend 
to this intruding information. (2) The paradigm necessitated apparent TTB usage as 
precondition for all analyses. Therefore a strategy induction procedure aiming at TTB 
was inescapable and analyses were limited to participants whose choice behavior was 
well-captured by TTB. Hence, the conclusion may only generalize to frugal decision 
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strategies that ignore some information, whereas an EAM approach also claims validity 
for mimicking compensatory strategies. 
To sum up, previous work on EAMs for multi-attribute decision tasks suggests that 
these models constitute a promising alternative to the MSMs predominantly 
investigated in decision making research. However, we argue that the aforementioned 
studies do not provide conclusive evidence for the superiority of the adjustable spanner 
metaphor as several aforementioned shortcomings need to be tackled. In the next 
section we introduce our latest attempt to do so.  
1.2.2 A new paradigm: Varying the levels of given evidence  
The basic idea for this paradigm is to confront participants with different levels of given 
evidence to contrast MSMs’ and EAMs’ predictions concerning the termination of 
information acquisition. Whereas EAMs predict stopping behavior in accordance to the 
proposed evidence threshold, MSMs predict stopping behavior in line with decision 
strategies’ stopping rules. Thus, according to MSMs stopping behavior should comply 
with a few distinct stopping behavior patterns that characterize the different stopping 
rules. In line with all of the aforementioned studies (Hausmann & Läge, 2008; 
Hausmann-Thürig, 2004; Jekel, 2012; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell & Lee, 2009, 
2011) as well as many studies within the MSM framework (e.g., Bergert & Nosofsky, 
2007; Bröder, 2000, 2003; Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b, 
2006a, 2006b; Dieckmann et al., 2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999; Rieskamp, 2006; 
Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; Scheibehenne et al., 2013) we concentrate our considerations 
concerning the MSM framework on TTB and compensatory strategies. As MSMs, 
however, do incorporate considerably more decision strategies (e.g., the “Take Two” 
heuristic, Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007), we will address the generalizability of our 
conclusions to further decision strategies and stopping rules in the discussion of 
Experiment 1 and, additionally, in the general discussion. 
To give an example for such a distinct stopping behavior pattern of the MSM 
framework, TTB’s stopping rule entails the termination of information search as soon as 
the most valid discriminating cue is found. Compensatory decision strategies hold that 
information search only stops when no further information is available. We consider 
these two stopping rules as the quintessential ones for the MSM framework. 
EAMs, in contrast, predict a more variable stopping behavior, contingent on the 
given evidence. For example, they allow for the termination of information search as 
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soon as the most valid discriminating cue is found (adhering to TTB’s stopping rule) 
when the cue validity of this cue is considerably high, whereas the same participant 
might continue information search (violating TTB’s stopping rule) when its validity is 
rather low (cf. Hausmann & Läge, 2008).  
From the EAM view, stopping behavior strictly in line with TTB’s stopping rule 
corresponds to a very low evidence threshold that is overshot by any given evidence. 
The other extreme of possible stopping behaviors is marked by exhaustive sampling of 
all available information as predicted by compensatory strategies (MSM view) or a very 
high evidence threshold that is not overshot by any given evidence (EAM perspective). 
By presenting participants with different levels of given evidence, we aim to investigate 
the range between the aforementioned extreme points and see whether systematic 
stopping behavior can be observed that confirms to the assumption of variable evidence 
thresholds. 
We implement this idea via half-open-half-closed information boards. The open part 
conveys different levels of given evidence and the closed part allows for further 
information acquisition. For each trial, we register whether a participant immediately 
stops information search or purchases more information alternatively. As TTB’s and the 
compensatory decision strategies’ stopping rules mark the MSM framework’s 
predictions for our investigation, the different levels of given evidence are constructed 
to each satisfy TTB’s stopping rule and miss the compensatory decision strategies’ 
stopping rule.  
Whereas the MSM framework therefore does not predict behavioral changes, the 
levels are designed in a way that EAMs do predict a distinct adaptation of the stopping 
behavior. For this aim, the given evidence in favor of one option increases from the 
lowest level 1 to the highest level 8. Table 1 shows the manipulation-relevant 
information openly displayed for each of the levels of given evidence. Here, cues are 
ordered from highest to lowest validity, and for simplicity, the displayed evidence in 
Table 1 always favors the left option. For example, the lowest level of given evidence, 
level 1, is characterized by non-discrimination of the two most valid cues (Cue1 and 
Cue 2) and positive evidence in favor of the left option given by the third most valid cue 
(Cue 3). According to TTB’s stopping rule, a decision maker should immediately 
terminate information search as the most valid discriminating cue is already openly 
displayed. Compensatory decision strategies predict that information search continues 
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as three more cues are hidden. Importantly, the same MSM predictions are valid for all 
levels of given evidence. The difference between the levels, however, lies in the given 
evidence. For example, in comparison to level 1, the second lowest level (level 2) gives 
more evidence, as it is the second most valid cue that discriminates between the options. 
The same logic applies to the remaining levels of given evidence. 
Table 1: Cue value manipulation for the levels of given evidence.  
  Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 
Cue 1 - - - - + - + - + - + - + - + - 
Cue 2 - - + - 
          
+ - 
Cue 3 + - 
          
+ - 
  Cue 4 
          
+ - 
    Cue 5 
        
+ - 
      Cue 6             + -                 
Note: “-” = initially displayed negative cue value; “+” = initially displayed positive cue 
value. Please note that this table shows only the manipulation-relevant cue values 
openly displayed. In sum, three cue values (manipulation-relevant plus further cue 
values) are openly displayed in each trial. 
In our experiments, participants are confronted with the different levels of given 
evidence (within subject manipulation) and have to choose the superior option in each 
trial. To solve this task, they can purchase further information or rely on the information 
already available to them. In the instructions as well as during each trial (cf. Figure 1), 
we inform participants about the cue validity hierarchy to make sure that the assumed 
ordering of the levels of given evidence is valid for each participant’s subject cue 
ordering. Across all trials, we keep the number of openly displayed pieces of 
information constant – mainly for two reasons: (1) For each trial the same information 
costs shall incur and (2) MSM’s stopping rules relying on a fixed number of cues shall 
predict the same behavior for each level. Figure 1 shows exemplary trials for the lowest 
and the highest level of given information as employed in our experiments.  
 Toolbox or spanner - A critical comparison 
13 
Figure 1: Test trials from level 1 (least given evidence, left part) and level 8 (most given 
evidence, right part). Note that on both levels, three cues are revealed, but the given 
evidence in favor of option A is much weaker in the left panel than in the right panel. 
Employing this paradigm, we are able to contrast the two frameworks of decision 
making: MSMs predict for all eight levels of given evidence that TTB users should 
immediately decide without further information search, whereas users of compensatory 
decision strategies should continue information search. Thus, neither the stopping 
behavior of a TTB user nor that of a compensatory strategy user should depend on the 
level of given evidence.2 According to EAMs, however, participants’ stopping behavior 
does not necessarily follow these extreme predictions, but the stopping point could be 
located anywhere on a continuum in between. This stopping point is characterized by 
the postulated evidence accumulation threshold. If the given evidence undershoots the 
threshold, participants should continue information acquisition, but if it is passed, 
participants should immediately stop information search. Thus, EAMs predict (for 
intermediate evidence thresholds) that a characteristic stopping behavior can be 
observed – continued information acquisition for lower levels, but stopping behavior for 
higher levels of given information. 
Based on these considerations we can derive three hypotheses concerning the 
stopping behavior – each focusing on a different level of aggregation – to contrast MSM 
and EAM predictions in our paradigm: Whereas MSMs predict a uniform stopping 
behavior across all levels, EAMs predicted a lower probability of immediate stopping 
                                                 
2 As mentioned before, stopping rules relying on a fixed number of cues to be acquired (cf., e.g., 
Gigerenzer, Dieckmann, & Gaissmaier, 2012) do also predict independence between stopping behavior 
and the levels of given information in our paradigm, as the same number of cues is openly displayed 
across all levels (see also the general discussion). 
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for lower levels of given evidence and a higher probability for higher levels. This 
prediction should hold on the group level (Hypothesis 1.a), but also for participants 
apparently using TTB as well as for users of compensatory strategies (Hypothesis 1.b), 
and for the majority of participants on the individual level (Hypothesis 1.c). Table 2 
(upper part) summarizes these three hypotheses that will be tested in all experiments 
reported herein. 
In addition to these hypotheses concerning the immediate stopping behavior in our 
paradigm, we aim to complement our aforementioned previous work (Söllner et al., 
2014) employing an information intrusion paradigm. Söllner and colleagues (2014) 
showed that decision makers seemingly using TTB do not ignore strategy-irrelevant 
information when it is given to them for free, without being intentionally acquired. 
However, critics might argue that these information intrusions caused demand effects, 
accounting for the consistent behavioral changes (e.g., concerning subsequent 
information search) in accordance with the content of these intrusions. Therefore, we 
investigate in the present work whether the content of intentionally purchased additional 
information will influence decision makers’ subsequent search and stop behavior. The 
MSM framework, represented by TTB and compensatory strategies, does not predict 
stopping behavior contingent on the content of information purchased in addition to 
TTB-relevant information: TTB users should not purchase additional information, but if 
they do so (applying TTB’s stopping rule with some random error), its content should 
not influence subsequent behavior. Compensatory strategies also predict stopping 
behavior independent of the content of the acquired information. However, if decision 
makers accumulate evidence as predicted by the EAMs, additional information that is in 
line (compatible) with the prior information, should more frequently lead to the 
termination of the search process, whereas incompatible information should lead to an 
extended information acquisition process. The rationale behind that EAM prediction is 
that a certain level of evidence plus further compatible evidence will more probably 
overshoot the fixed evidence threshold (and therefore terminate information search) 
than a certain level of evidence that is further reduced by incompatible evidence (cf. 
Söllner et al., 2014). We test this Hypothesis 2 (see Table 2, lower part) for all 
experiments reported herein. 
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Table 2: Overview of the hypotheses concerning stopping behavior in Experiments 1- 3. 
Dependent 
variable (DV) 
Independent 
variable (IV) 
Hypo-
thesis 
Level of 
analysis MSM prediction EAM prediction 
Immediate 
stopping of 
information 
search  
Levels of 
given evidence 
1.a 
Group level: 
all 
participants 
Probability of immediate 
stopping is equal across 
all levels 
Probability of immediate 
stopping increases with 
increasing IV 
1.b 
Subgroup 
level: TTB, 
COMP 
Probability of immediate 
stopping is equally high 
(TTB) / low (COMP) 
across all levels 
Probability of immediate 
stopping increases with 
increasing IV 
1.c 
Individual 
level: each 
participant 
Probability of immediate 
stopping is independent 
of IV 
Probability of immediate 
stopping increases with 
increasing IV (threshold 
estimation is possible) 
Extent of 
further 
information 
search  
Compatibility 
with prior 
information 
2 
Group level: 
all 
participants 
Number of purchased 
pieces of information:  
(compatible) = 
(incompatible) 
Number of purchased 
pieces of information:  
(compatible) < 
(incompatible) 
Note: MSM = multiple-strategy model; SPM = single-process model; EAM = evidence 
accumulation model; TTB = “take-the-best” heuristic; COMP = compensatory strategy. 
Our novel paradigm combines several features, we believe to be advantageous as 
compared to former studies: (1) The paradigm includes the accumulation prediction of 
the evidence accumulation models. In contrast to Hausmann and Läge's (2008) 
paradigm that only compared single cue validities to thresholds, we also consider 
combinations of cues (levels 4 to 8 allow for the accumulation of the positive evidence 
given by the most valid cue and another less valid one, see Table 1) that form the basis 
of EAMs. (2) The paradigm is not restricted to the two extreme points of the stopping 
behavior continuum (i.e., TTB versus all cues), but concentrates on the range between 
them by systematically varying the levels of given evidence. From that feature the 
possibility arises to estimate an individual evidence threshold for each of the 
participants. Hence, we can test whether individual stopping behavior depends on the 
given information as predicted by EAMs, but not MSMs for our stimuli. (3) The 
paradigm aims at basic assumptions derived from the two frameworks of interest 
(MSMs and EAMs) instead of testing specific models like Decision Field Theory 
(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) or the diffusion decision model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 
2008). Hence, conclusions generalize to whole model classes and do not depend on 
specific parameterizations (e.g., Newell & Lee, 2009; 2011; Scheibehenne et al., 2013). 
(4) In comparison to our previous work (Söllner et al., 2014), the levels of given 
evidence paradigm does not evoke demand effects due to intruding information and (5), 
most importantly, the predictions do not hinge on successfully inducing a specific 
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decision strategy like TTB. Rather, participants can adapt their behavior in an individual 
fashion.  
2 Overview of the experiments 
All three experiments reported herein employed an identical task structure: Participants 
were repeatedly asked to choose among two alternatives the option that scores highest 
on a certain criterion. The criterion value for each option was obtained by the following 
equation: criterion value = 83 * c1 + 49 * c2 + 29 * c3 + 17 * c4 + 10 * c5 + 6 * c6.3 
For each correct choice (i.e., the option with the higher criterion value was chosen) 
participants received a constant reward, an incorrect choice did not affect their serial 
account. As decision aid, six cues were available that could take on either a positive cue 
value (depicted by a “+”) or a negative cue value (depicted by a “-”). Participants were 
informed about the hierarchy of the cue validities – the cue presented on the top of the 
list being the most valid one and the one presented at the bottom being the least valid 
one (but still above chance level). In each trial, at least one cue had to be purchased 
before making a choice. 
All experiments consisted of an initial calibration phase (60 trials), a test phase, a 
short break, a second calibration phase (30 trials), and a concluding test phase. This set-
up was chosen for mainly two reasons: (1) Participants should first select their preferred 
decision strategy (or calibrate their evidence threshold respectively) bottom-up via 
feedback before being presented with the novel paradigm in the test phase. (2) As the 
considerably numerous test trials entailed no feedback, we decided to present the test 
phase in halves interspersed by a shorter calibration phase that should refresh the 
previous learning experience.  
In the calibration phases participants were presented with closed information 
boards. Participants could uncover as many cues as they liked by clicking on them with 
the computer mouse. Each cue purchase implied a constant amount of information cost 
that would be subtracted from the potential reward for a correct choice. After each 
purchase, participants could stop information acquisition and make their choice by 
clicking on the respective button for each option. They got immediate feedback on 
                                                 
3 C1 stands for the cue value of cue 1, i.e. the most valid cue, c2 for the cue value of cue 2, i.e. the second 
most valid cue, … A positive cue value (“+”) for an option entered the equation as “1”, whereas “-1” 
represented a negative cue value (“-“) for an option. 
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whether they chose the correct option, which reward they therefore received, what 
information costs incurred and, finally, what amount would be added to the serial 
account. Accordingly, the openly displayed serial account was updated. 
 In the test phases, two changes occurred: (1) Participants received no feedback on 
their choices and although the serial account was updated in each trial, it was not openly 
displayed to the participants. (2) Participants were not presented with closed 
information boards, but with the aforementioned half-open-half-closed information 
boards of the levels of given evidence paradigm. In particular, three cues were openly 
displayed, whereas the remaining three cues could be purchased by the participants. 
Information costs, however, incurred for all visible cues – the three pre-opened ones and 
each additionally purchased one. Figure 1 shows two exemplary trials from the test 
phase of Experiment 3.4 
3 Experiment 1: Establishing the levels of given evidence paradigm 
In the first experiment, we aimed to establish our new approach to disentangle the two 
frameworks of multi-attribute decision making. We imposed an intermediate degree of 
information costs that yielded a comparable payoff for TTB and well-adapted 
compensatory decision strategies5 (see Table 3, upper part). From the EAM view, this 
should lead to moderate evidence thresholds for the majority of participants. Note that 
                                                 
4 Two further comments on the parallels between the three experiments seem warranted: (1) We 
employed the same diagnostic pairs in the calibration phases of the experiments. Thus, the basis for the 
strategy classification procedure is identical across all experiments. (2) We took care that the validity 
hierarchy displayed to the participants was veridical and in line with the discrimination rate hierarchy in 
both calibration phase and test phase. As several authors have pointed out the relevance of both 
variables to the search order in multi-attribute decision tasks with closed information boards (e.g., 
Hausmann-Thürig, 2004; Newell, Rakow, Weston, & Shanks, 2004; Rakow, Newell, Fayers, & Hersby, 
2005; see also Gigerenzer, Dieckmann, & Gaissmaier, 2012, for further search rules) and both Lee and 
Cummins’ (2004) as well as Hausmann and Läge’s (2008) EAM consider both variables for their search 
predictions, we wanted validity and discrimination rate (and all reasonable combinations of them) to 
predict the same search order in our paradigm. Therefore, both validity and discrimination rate were 
highest for cue 1 (c1) and lowest for cue 6 (c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3 ≥ c4 ≥ c5 ≥ c6). 
5 We considered four different compensatory decision strategies (COMP1, COMP2, COMP3, and EQW) 
in the strategy classification. These decision strategies differed in their weight allocation to the different 
cues – from an almost non-compensatory strategy that allowed only four (or more) less valid cues to 
outweigh a more valid one (COMP1) to the so-called equal weight rule (EQW; Dawes, 1979; Payne, 
Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) that gave equal weights to all cues irrespective of the validity hierarchy.  
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we aimed at moderate evidence thresholds because extremely high and extremely low 
evidence thresholds are problematic for our approach – they cannot be captured by the 
eight levels of given evidence employed herein. Decision makers with such extreme 
thresholds (EAM view) are not diagnostic for our research question, as they will behave 
in line with MSMs’ predictions. Therefore, we aimed to minimize extreme behavior that 
might be in line with the EAM prediction, but only for levels of given evidence outside 
our paradigm’s observational window. 
Table 3: Expected payoffs for decision strategies in Experiments 1 - 3.  
Experiment, 
condition 
decision strategies included in strategy classification optimal 
COMP TTB COMP1* COMP2* COMP3* EQW* 
1, all 28940 25280 28320 28160 24240 29760 
2, low relative cost 52590 49680 53730 51840 43875 54540 
2, high relative cost 33560 29440 31840 30720 26000 32320 
3, low relative cost 64984 64416 69344 68640 59136 71808 
3, high relative cost 54736 38064 40976 40560 34944 42432 
Note: TTB = “take-the-best” heuristic; COMP1 - COMP3 = compensatory decision 
strategies; EQW = equal weight rule; optimal COMP = compensatory strategy that 
predicts the correct choice in each trial. The decision strategy with the highest expected 
payoff is printed bold. Strategies marked with “*” are pooled for further analyses as 
compensatory strategies (COMP).  
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Design and procedure 
We manipulated within subject the levels of given information (8 levels) in the test 
phase. For each level of given evidence, we administered five different test trials in each 
of the two test phases. The three initially hidden cues were constant within each level 
and chosen in order to maximize the validity of the hidden information. Table 4 shows 
the initially openly displayed cue value constellation for each level of given evidence in 
the test phases of Experiment 1.  
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Table 4: Levels of given evidence (level 1: minimum evidence; level 8: maximum 
evidence) - manipulation in Experiment 1 with maximized validity of hidden 
information. 
  Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 
Cue 1 - - - - + - + - + - + - + - + - 
Cue 2 - - + - ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? + - 
Cue 3 + - ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? + - ? ? 
Cue 4 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? + - ? ? ? ? 
Cue 5 ? ? ? ? - - - - + - ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Cue 6 ? ? - - - - + - - - - - - - - - 
Note: “-” = initially displayed negative cue value; “+” = initially displayed positive cue 
value; “?” = initially hidden cue value. 
In addition to these manipulation-relevant test trials, eight distractor trials per test 
phase were presented that (1) were meant to distract participants from the fact that in the 
relevant test trials only one option obtained positive cue values whereas the other one 
had negative cue values openly displayed only and (2) helped to establish the same cue 
validity (and discrimination rate) hierarchy as in the calibration phase. In sum, we 
administered 90 calibration trials and 96 test phase trials. 
For Experiment 1, we employed the following blind date task: Participants were 
told that they should imagine being new in town and in search for interesting people to 
meet. The dating portal that they chose to help them with this quest had an innovative 
approach to see whether people match with each other: Only shortly before the 
appointed dating time, the potential dating partner was presented with two restaurants 
located in the town, had to choose one of them and go there to wait for the (hopefully) 
upcoming date. The other person was presented with the same two restaurants and 
should ideally choose the same one as the potential dating partner. If so, the both of 
them had the chance to meet and spend an evening together, if not, they missed this 
opportunity. As our participants were new in town, they knew nothing about the two 
presented options, but they could ask advisors for help. The helpfulness (i.e., validity) 
of these advices (positive or negative evaluation of the respective restaurant) differed 
between advisors. The hierarchy of this helpfulness was depicted on the screen with the 
upmost advisor being the most helpful one and the lowermost being the least helpful, 
but better than chance. Each consultation with an advisor cost ten minutes time that 
were subtracted from the 220 minutes that could be spent with the date when the correct 
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restaurant was chosen. Participants were repeatedly asked to solve this task for different 
restaurants (A and B) and the total dating time was recorded in a serial account. The 
goal for the participants was to maximize the total dating time as the four participants 
with the highest end balance would receive 25 Euros reward. 
The procedure started with an initial practice trial. Then the first calibration phase 
was administered. Participants had to consult at least one advisor prior to making their 
choice. After each decision, participants got feedback on their choice – a binary verbal 
feedback (“YES!” or “NO!”) whether the option with the higher criterion value had 
been chosen6. 
Having completed the first calibration phase, participants were told that they would 
go on with exactly the same task, apart from two changes: (1) No choice feedback was 
given anymore, but the hidden serial account was further updated. (2) Three advisors 
had been consulted already. Thus, a choice could instantly be made or further 
information could be collected.  
After the first test phase, a short break was announced and participants left the 
room for approximately five minutes. When they came back, they were reminded of the 
instructions and subsequently worked through the second half of the experiment.  
3.1.2 Participants 
In this experiment, 63 participants (55 female, mean age 20.6) took part, all but one 
being students from the University of Mannheim. They received course credit for their 
participation. The best four participants (in terms of payoff achieved) additionally 
received 25 Euros (approx. USD 35). 
3.2 Results and discussion 
3.2.1 Strategy classification 
The decision strategy classification was based on the choice outcomes of the 90 
calibration trials administered in the two calibration phases. The outcome-based strategy 
                                                 
6 One half of the participants (31 of 63) additionally received continuous feedback after each choice. 
Here, a bar plot indicating the criterion value for both options was displayed. As this feedback 
manipulation did not affect participants’ choice and search behavior, we pooled both feedback 
conditions for all reported analyses of Experiment 1. In Experiments 2 and 3, we gave binary verbal 
feedback only to all participants. 
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classification (Bröder, 2010; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003a) revealed that 24 participants 
were classified as most in line with TTB and 36 participants behaved most consistent 
with compensatory decision strategies. Three participants’ choice outcomes were 
equally probable for TTB and one of the compensatory strategies (unclear strategy 
classification). No participant was excluded due to the estimated choice error rate (ε) as 
they all were below ε = .40 for the best fitting strategy (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003a). 
3.2.2 Stop of information search 
Hypotheses 1.a to 1.c related to the immediate stopping of information search in the test 
phase. MSMs predicted that the stopping behavior is independent of the levels of given 
evidence, whereas EAMs held that the probability of immediate stopping increases with 
increasing levels of given evidence. Figure 2 shows the observed mean percentage of 
immediate stopping for each level of given evidence in Experiment 1.  
 
Figure 2: Percentage of immediate stopping of information search in Experiment 1 
(error bars represent standard errors). 
For Hypothesis 1.a on the group level of all participants, a repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant effect (Greenhouse-Geisser-corrected F(3.73, 231.18) = 
70.69, p < .001, η² = .53) of the levels of given information as predicted by the EAMs. 
We found a linear trend (F(1, 62) = 134.95, p < .001, η² = .69), indicating that with 
increasing levels of given information the percentage of immediate stopping also 
increased.  
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Analyzing the sub-groups of participants classified either as TTB or COMP 
participants (according to the calibration phase choices) for Hypothesis 1.b, we found a 
significant effect of the levels of given evidence on the stopping behavior for both of 
them (TTB: F(3.38, 77.79) = 17.22, p < .001; η² = .43; COMP: F(3.58, 125.21) = 54.28, 
p < .001; η² = .61) as predicted by the EAMs. For both sub-groups a linear trend was 
observed (TTB: F(1, 23) = 36.74, p < .001, η² = .62; COMP: F(1, 35) = 88.43, p < .001, 
η² = .72). As can be seen from Figure 2, the percentage of immediate stopping was 
higher for TTB participants than for COMP participants across all levels of given 
evidence (independent sample one-sided t-tests for each level: all p’s ≤ .018).  
For Hypothesis 1.c we ran a binary logistic regression for each participant. Thus, an 
S-shaped psychometric function was fitted whose turning point indicated the proposed 
individual threshold. We used the Wald-test to determine whether the stopping behavior 
was independent of the levels of given evidence as predicted by MSMs. A positive 
effect of the levels of given evidence on the stopping behavior as predicted by the 
EAMs was indicated by a significant Wald-test for a positive regression weight. For 
five participants we observed behavior to such an extent in line with the EAM 
prediction that a regression weight estimation was not possible (due to (quasi-)complete 
separation, Albert & Anderson, 1984). Hence, these participants showed a deterministic 
threshold located between two adjacent levels of given information. For further 43 
participants we found a positive regression weight with a significant Wald-test (p < .05). 
Taken together, these 76 % of our participants stopped information acquisition as 
predicted by the EAMs and significantly deviated from the MSM prediction. Fourteen 
participants’ (22 %) stopping behavior did not significantly depend on the levels of 
given evidence. This behavior could either be interpreted as evidence accumulation with 
a very high or very low evidence threshold (EAM view) or, alternatively, as being in 
line with MSMs’ prediction. For one participant we found a significant negative 
regression weight – a pattern that was neither predicted by EAMs nor MSMs. Thus, in 
regard to Hypothesis 1.c, the majority of participants behaved in line with the EAM 
prediction, whereas MSMs could only account for a minority of participants.  
For the 76 % of participants whose behavior was well described by EAMs, we 
estimated the individual evidence thresholds, i.e. the (theoretical) level of given 
evidence where the turning point of the logistic function was located and the probability 
of immediate stopping equaled .50. Comparing participants whose behavior in the 
calibration phase was best described by TTB with COMP participants, we found a 
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significantly lower mean evidence threshold for TTB (4.42) than for COMP users (6.53; 
one-sided t(43) = 2.83, p = .004). Figure 3 displays the estimated individual logistic 
functions.7  
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Figure 3: Individual estimated logistic functions for TTB (left part) and COMP (right 
part) participants in line with EAMs (upper part) or MSMs (lower part) in Experiment 
1.8  
                                                 
7 For the participants with (quasi-)complete separation we estimated the evidence threshold by 
substituting one trial of the original data pattern to receive a less perfect (i.e., not quasi-completely 
separated) input for the binary logistic regression. From the then gained regression parameters the 
evidence threshold was estimated. The reported analyses concerning the mean evidence thresholds for 
TTB and COMP participants were not affected by this substitution; the results were similar when the 
participants were excluded from the analysis. 
8 The three participants with unclear strategy classification were excluded. 
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Note: For TTB and COMP participants compatible with EAMs (upper part) the mean 
estimated evidence threshold is displayed. 
3.2.3 Further information search 
In addition to the dichotomous variable whether participants immediately stop 
information search, we could investigate the subsequent search behavior when 
information acquisition was not immediately abandoned. From the MSM view, stopping 
behavior should not depend on the compatibility of the uncovered information with the 
initial evidence (at least, when considering only TTB and compensatory decision 
strategies, but see discussion). EAMs predicted a higher probability of continued 
information acquisition when incompatible information was found than when the 
uncovered information was in line (i.e., compatible) with the initial evidence.  
To test Hypothesis 2, we contrasted two compatible trials and two incompatible trials 
per level of given evidence. A compatible (or incompatible) trial was defined as a trial 
where the most valid initially hidden cue plus at least one of the remaining cues 
supported (or weakened) the initially openly displayed evidence. As we did not include 
compatible trials in level 1 and 8, our analyses were limited to levels 2 to 7. Table 5 
shows the mean number of additionally purchased cues across all participants. Note that 
the minimum value was 1 as only when at least one field was additionally purchased the 
trial could be analyzed; the maximum value was 3 as only three cues were initially 
hidden in each test phase trial. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect of the compatibility of information as predicted by EAMs (F(1, 55) = 326.77, p < 
.001, η² = .86). Independent sample t-tests confirmed this finding for each level 
separately (all p’s < .001).  
Table 5: Mean number of additionally purchased cues in case of no immediate stopping 
in Experiment 1. 
 
Mean number of additionally purchased cues (N) 
  level 2 level 3 level 4 level 5 level 6 level 7 all 
incompatible 2.40 (97) 2.34 (95) 2.41 (87) 2.46 (82) 2.35 (81) 2.25 (57) 2.38 (499) 
compatible 1.15 (102) 1.12 (95) 1.07 (89) 1.10 (80) 1.05 (81) 1.02 (52) 1.09 (499) 
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3.2.4 Discussion 
In this experiment, we set out to establish a novel paradigm manipulating levels of 
given information under optimal conditions, meaning an information cost manipulation 
that should induce moderate evidence accumulation thresholds (EAM view). The 
considerable number of both TTB and COMP classifications (MSM view) found 
constitutes a promising basis for that. 
The analyses concerning the stopping behavior yielded results well in line with the 
EAM prediction: The probability of immediate stopping increased with increasing 
levels of given evidence on the group level, for the subgroups of apparent TTB and 
COMP users and on the individual level for the majority of our participants. 
Additionally, the compatibility analysis (cf. Söllner et al., 2014) for the continued 
information acquisition supported the EAM view.  
The novel paradigm offered the possibility to estimate the postulated evidence 
accumulation threshold. The comparison of the estimated thresholds for apparent TTB 
and COMP users confirmed the adequacy of our approach: We observed a lower mean 
evidence accumulation threshold for participants classified as TTB-consistent – a 
finding that was predicted by the characteristic mimicking between EAM and MSM. 
Note that this relationship held despite relying on different data: The strategy 
classification was based on the calibration trials, the threshold estimate was derived 
from the test trials. Thus, we are confident that participants kept their initially selected 
strategy (or did not distinctly adjust their initial evidence threshold respectively) in the 
test phase. 
An interesting finding that has not been addressed so far concerns the influence of 
the validity of the hidden cues on the stopping behavior. Although the linear trend in the 
stopping behavior (Hypothesis 1.a) was significant, descriptively we observed an 
unexpected drop in the percentage of immediate stopping for the three lowest levels of 
given evidence (see Figure 2, grey shaded area). We conjecture that this pattern is due 
to the different mean validity of hidden information employed in levels 1, 2, and 3 that 
worked against the EAM hypothesis viewing the level of given evidence as main 
predictor of stopping behavior: Level 1 offered the lowest validity of hidden 
information, meaning that participants could only purchase information of low value 
(validity and discrimination rate). For level 2, the average validity of hidden cues was 
higher – participants could purchase information of higher value – and for level 3, the 
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validity was highest (and equal to the validity of hidden information employed for 
levels 4 and 5, see Table 4). Participants’ stopping behavior was, as we have shown, 
strongly influenced by the levels of given evidence, but it also seems to depend on 
participants’ consideration, how useful the cues are that can be purchased. 
A potential criticism concerning the MSM prediction could relate to our 
concentration on TTB’s stopping rule as only alternative to the exhaustive search 
predicted by compensatory strategies. Of course, other stopping rules have been 
discussed, for example stopping after two discriminating compatible cues (“Take Two” 
heuristic, Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007) or stopping after a certain number of cues (cf. 
Gigerenzer, Dieckmann, & Gaissmaier, 2012). As these stopping rules were far less 
frequently investigated in previous research than TTB’s one-reason stopping rule, we 
concentrated on the latter one. However, our conclusions also hold when the 
aforementioned other stopping rules (within the MSM framework) are considered: If 
participants employed a stopping rule depending on the mere number of uncovered 
cues, we would again expect a uniform stopping behavior across all levels of given 
evidence as for all levels the same number of cues were openly displayed. If participants 
employed a two-reason stopping rule, an increase in the stopping probability between 
levels 3 (levels 1 to 3 displayed only one discriminating cue openly) and 4 (levels 4 to 8 
displayed two compatible discriminating cues openly) would be expected. However, 
there should be no increase in the stopping behavior when analyzing levels 4 to 8 only 
(MSM prediction). The results of this additional analysis were again in line with the 
EAM prediction: The probability of immediate stopping increased with increasing 
levels of given evidence (F(2.52, 156.48) = 88.09, p < .001, η² = .59; linear trend: F(1, 
62) = 161.69, p < .001, η² = .72). The same reasoning holds for the compatibility 
analysis: The compatibility effect predicted by EAMs was not limited to levels 2 and 3, 
but was observed for the remaining levels 4 - 7 as well. However, we will address this 
potential criticism of our approach again in the general discussion. 
4 Experiment 2: Replication of Experiment 1 in a different task domain  
Experiment 2 had three aims: First, we strove to replicate the finding of EAM-
consistent behavior in another, more established task domain, namely the oil drilling 
task (Rieskamp, 2006; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Second, we investigated the impact of 
the validity of hidden cues by setting it to the lowest (instead of highest) possible level 
within each level of given information. If the conjecture posed in the discussion of 
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Experiment 1 is correct, this should eliminate the unexpected "drop" in stopping 
probabilities across levels 1 to 3 observed in Experiment 1. Third, to further explore the 
mimicking relationship between the multiple-strategy approach and the EAMs, we 
manipulated information costs between participants, impacting on the payoff structure 
of the environment. As this manipulation has been shown to affect strategy 
classifications (Bröder, 2000; 2003; Newell & Shanks, 2003; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), 
we expected it to also affect the estimated thresholds in the EAM approach. 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Design and procedure 
The design of Experiment 2 resembled the one of Experiment 1. We again manipulated 
the levels of given information within subject (8 levels) and additionally varied 
information costs between subjects (high versus low). We adopted the manipulation of 
Experiment 1 as high cost condition (relative costs per cue = 10 / 220 ≈ 4.5 %) and 
added a low (relative) cost condition (relative costs per cue = 10 / 330 ≈ 3.0 %). 
Whereas the high cost condition favored noncompensatory (TTB) strategy usage, the 
low cost condition slightly favored well-calibrated compensatory strategies over TTB in 
terms of payoff (see Table 3). 
The same 90 calibration trials as in Experiment 1 were administered, but the test 
phase trials were adjusted for two reasons: (1) The compatibility of the hidden cue 
information was manipulated across all levels of given evidence, instead of only levels 
2 to 7 as in Experiment 1. (2) Instead of maximizing the validity of hidden information 
for each level of given evidence (cf. Experiment 1), we minimized this factor to 
illustrate that the non-linear deviation observed for the lower levels of given evidence in 
Experiment 1 was caused by the discussed difference in the validity of hidden 
information for these levels. As can be seen in Table 6, the minimization of the validity 
of hidden information led to a constant mean validity of hidden information for levels 1 
to 3, 7, and 8. Thus, the deviation on the lower levels should vanish in Experiment 2. In 
order to achieve a similar validity (and discrimination rate) hierarchy in the calibration 
and test phase, distractor trials were adjusted as well, leading to 56 trials (8 (levels) * 5 
test trials + 16 distracters) for each of the two test phases. 
Experiment 2’s procedure also closely resembled the one of Experiment 1. 
Participants were told that they should imagine working for an oil drilling company. 
Their task was to repeatedly choose among two potential drilling sites the one that 
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probably contains the most oil. As decision aid, a test institute could be commissioned 
to run analyses of varying helpfulness (validity). When choosing the correct site, the 
company paid a bonus of 220 (high relative cost condition) or 330 (low relative cost 
condition) Penunzen (a virtual currency). For each analysis, the test institute received 10 
Penunzen from the bonus and no money when the incorrect option was chosen. A serial 
account kept track of the participant’s earnings (not displayed in the test phases). The 
four participants with the highest end balance received a 25 Euro reward. 
As for Experiment 1, in the calibration phase the information board was closed and 
(binary) feedback was given after each decision. In the test phase, participants were 
confronted with half-open-half-closed information boards and no feedback was given. 
Table 6 shows the test phase manipulation for Experiment 2.  
Table 6: Levels of given evidence (level 1: minimum evidence; level 8: maximum 
evidence) - manipulation in Experiment 2 with minimized validity of hidden 
information. 
  Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 
Cue 1 - - - - + - + - + - + - + - + - 
Cue 2 - - + - - - - - - - - - - - + - 
Cue 3 + - - - - - ? ? ? ? ? ? + - - - 
Cue 4 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? + - ? ? ? ? 
Cue 5 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? + - ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Cue 6 ? ? ? ? ? ? + - ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Note: “-“ = initially displayed negative cue value; “+” = initially displayed positive cue 
value; “?” = initially hidden cue value. 
4.1.2 Participants  
Sixty-three participants (45 female, mean age 21.1) took part in this experiment, all but 
one being students from the University of Mannheim. They received either course credit 
or 5 Euros compensation for their participation. The best four participants (two per 
condition) additionally received 25 Euros. Thirty-two participants were tested in the low 
information cost condition, 31 participants completed the high information cost 
condition. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
For Experiment 2, we investigated the hypotheses depicted in Table 2. Additionally, we 
predicted that participants’ choice behavior in the calibration phase should be more in 
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line with TTB (and less in line with COMP) in the high information cost condition than 
in the low cost condition. This expected effect at the level of strategy classifications 
should translate to the mean estimated evidence accumulation thresholds as MSMs and 
EAMs mimic each other. 
4.3 Results and discussion 
4.3.1 Strategy classification 
Decision strategies were classified with the outcome-based classification method 
(Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b; Bröder, 2010) on the basis of the 90 calibration trials. In the 
low cost condition, we classified 14 participants to be most consistent with TTB and 18 
participants with COMP. In the high cost condition, we found TTB to be the best fitting 
strategy for six participants and COMP for 25 participants. Testing this difference, we 
found a significant effect of the information cost manipulation in the non-predicted 
direction (χ² (1, N = 63) = 4.33, p = .038): Participants in the high information cost 
condition showed somewhat less TTB-consistent behavior than participants in the low 
information cost condition. We will discuss this surprising finding below. 
4.3.2 Stop of information search 
Again, we analyzed for the test trials the dichotomous dependent variable whether 
information search was immediately abandoned when a certain level of evidence was 
presented. Figure 4 shows the mean percentage of immediate stopping across all 
participants and for the sub-groups of TTB and COMP participants separately.  
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Figure 4: Percentage of immediate stopping of information search in Experiment 2 
(error bars represent standard errors). 
For Hypothesis 1.a on the group level of all participants, we found a significant 
effect (F(4.13, 256.20) = 48.78, p < .001, η² = .44) as predicted by the EAMs: With 
increasing levels of given evidence the percentage of immediate stopping increased 
(linear trend: F(1, 62) = 118.06, p < .001, η² = .66). 
Hypothesis 1.b referred to two sub-groups (TTB and COMP participants) constituted 
on the basis of the calibration phase strategy classification. For both sub-groups we 
found support for the EAM prediction (TTB: F(3.30, 62.66) = 10.33, p < .001, η² = .35; 
COMP: F(4.41, 185.09) = 40.10, p < .001, η² = .49): Participants whose calibration 
phase behavior was best described by the decision strategy TTB as well as COMP 
participants showed more frequent stopping behavior with increasing levels of given 
evidence (linear contrast TTB: F(1, 19) = 20.36, p < .001, η² = .52; linear contrast 
COMP: F(1, 42) = 108.71, p < .001, η² = .72). Across all levels of given evidence the 
percentage of immediate stopping was higher for TTB participants than for COMP 
participants (independent sample one-sided t-tests: all p’s ≤ .001).  
Hypothesis 1.c referred to the individual stopping behavior of the participants. 
Running binary logistic regressions for each of them, we found that one participant 
showed behavior almost perfectly in line with the EAM prediction (quasi-complete 
separation) and for 40 participants we found a significantly positive slope according to 
the Wald-test (p < .05). These 65 % of our participants showed stopping behavior in line 
 Toolbox or spanner - A critical comparison 
31 
with the EAM prediction, but deviated from MSM prediction. For the remaining 22 
participants (35 %) we observed a slope that did not significantly differ from zero – an 
observation that is well predicted by MSMs, but does not necessarily contradict the 
EAM prediction (cf. Experiment 1).  
Levels of given evidence
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 e
st
im
at
ed
 p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
im
m
ed
ia
te
 s
to
p
p
in
g
 
Figure 5: Individual estimated logistic functions for TTB (left part) and COMP (right 
part) participants in line with EAMs (upper part) or MSMs (lower part) in Experiment 
2. 
Note: For TTB and COMP participants compatible with EAMs (upper part) the mean 
estimated evidence threshold is displayed. 
In Figure 5 the individual estimated logistic functions for all participants are 
displayed. Estimating the evidence threshold for those 65 % of our participants that 
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showed a significantly positive slope9, we found that participants classified as TTB 
users had a significantly lower evidence threshold (3.57) than COMP participants (5.27; 
one-sided t(39) = 1.82, p = .039). Hence, the expected mimicking relationship between 
MSM and EAM was observed. 
4.3.3 Further information search 
The information acquisition behavior could further be analyzed by concentrating on 
trials where at least one piece of information was additionally purchased by the 
participant. Here, we contrasted for each level of given evidence two trials with 
information compatible with the initially open information and two trials with 
incompatible information (see Experiment 1 for further details). Table 7 shows the 
mean number of additionally purchased pieces of information for the compatible and 
the incompatible trials. 
Table 7: Mean number of additionally purchased cues in case of no immediate stopping 
in Experiment 2. 
 
Mean number of additionally purchased cues (N) 
  level 1 level 2 level 3 level 4 level 5 level 6 level 7 level 8 all 
incompatible 2.47 (90) 2.47 (66) 2.36 (59) 2.38 (65) 2.20 (61) 1.88 (57) 2.39 (31) 2.00 (18) 2.30 (447) 
compatible 1.11 (85) 1.10 (70) 1.12 (66) 1.09 (66) 1.05 (73) 1.06 (53) 1.03 (31) 1.00 (20) 1.08 (464) 
 
Testing Hypothesis 2, we found a significant effect of the compatibility of the 
purchased information on the number of acquired pieces of information (F(1, 52) = 
198.70, p < .001; η² = .79). This effect was observed for each level of given evidence 
(independent sample t-tests: all p’s < .001). 
4.3.4 Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we succeeded in replicating Experiment 1’s findings concerning 
participants’ stopping behavior in an alternative task domain. These results unanimously 
support the EAM view (see discussion of Experiment 1). Consistent with our 
                                                 
9 For the one participant with quasi-complete separation we estimated the evidence threshold by 
substituting one trial. With this less perfect data pattern a binary logistic regression was run and from 
the gained parameter the evidence threshold was estimated (cf. Experiment 1). The reported analyses 
concerning the mean evidence thresholds for TTB and COMP participants were not affected by this 
substitution; the conclusions were identical when the participant was excluded.  
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considerations, the previously observed drop in the percentage of immediate stopping 
for the lower levels of given evidence (cf. Experiment 1, Figure 2) vanished when the 
validity of hidden information for these levels was constant (see Figure 4). The grey 
shaded area in Figure 4 highlights an expected drop in the probability of immediate 
stopping that is consistent with Experiment 2’s validity of hidden information 
manipulation (cf. Table 6): When participants could get more value (in terms of validity 
and discrimination rate) for the same information costs, they were more willing to 
purchase another cue. Hence, the individual stopping behavior did not only depend on 
the nature of the given information, but was also highly sensitive to the value (validity) 
of the information that could still be obtained.  
Although the replication of Experiment 1 was our major aim, we additionally 
intended to investigate how a decision strategy shift caused by an information cost 
manipulation might translate to the evidence thresholds estimated within our novel 
paradigm. Unfortunately, our information cost manipulation failed to induce the 
expected decision strategy shift and further analyses of this factor were therefore 
obsolete. Although this significant result could, of course, be due to chance, we 
hypothesize that, possibly, the information cost manipulation was ineffective for mainly 
two reasons: (1) As we wanted to replicate Experiment 1’s design and procedure as 
closely as possible, we did not convert the virtual currency into real money that is 
immediately given to the participants after the experiment (Newell, Weston, & Shanks, 
2003), but gave a (delayed) reward to the best four participants only (Bröder, 2000, 
2003). Possibly, this delayed, uncertain reward reduced participants’ motivation to 
maximize their earnings (see Cardinal, 2006, for a review on delay discounting and 
uncertainty discounting). (2) The difference between the two conditions (3.0 % versus 
4.5 %) was quite small and the manipulation itself therefore probably too weak. 
Although this information cost manipulation was included in Experiment 2 for 
demonstrational purposes only (namely that the estimated thresholds mirror the decision 
strategy use), we address this unsatisfactory result in Experiment 3.  
5 Experiment 3: Examining the influence of a second factor (validity of hidden 
information) on the stopping behavior 
In Experiment 2, we replicated the findings of Experiment 1, showing that the stopping 
behavior of our participants was well-captured by the EAM prediction, whereas MSMs 
could only account for the behavior of a minority of our participants. Both experiments 
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supported the adequacy of our paradigm as the mean estimated evidence threshold for 
participants seemingly using TTB was significantly lower than for compensatory 
strategy users – a finding that is well in line with the aforementioned mimicking 
relationship of the two frameworks. Our attempt to further confirm the validity of our 
estimation procedure via shifting the decision strategy distribution (cf. Experiment 2) 
failed due to an unsuccessful information cost manipulation. Therefore, in Experiment 3 
we employed a stronger manipulation to induce a shift as precondition for further 
analyses. 
In addition to the levels of given information, we observed in both Experiments 1 
and 2 a second factor that seemed to systematically influence the stopping behavior of 
the participants: the validity of hidden information. Within our paradigm, it is not 
possible to deconfound both factors entirely because the former restricts the possible 
combinations of the latter. In Experiments 1 and 2, we maximized and minimized the 
validity of hidden information for each level of given evidence, respectively. In 
Experiment 3, we systematically varied the validity of hidden information within the 
levels factor to investigate the impact of both factors separately. 
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Design and procedure 
The design and procedure of Experiment 3 closely resembled the one of Experiment 2. 
We manipulated information costs (high versus low) between subjects. Within subjects 
we manipulated, as in Experiments 1 and 2, the levels of given information (8 levels) 
and, additionally, the validity of hidden information (7 levels) in any feasible 
combination. Appendix 1 shows the resulting 24 combinations of the two factors 
administered in the test phase.  
We again employed the oil drilling task (Rieskamp, 2006; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), 
but in the low cost condition participants were informed that each analysis cost 2 % of 
the potential bonus of 400 Penunzen, whereas in the high cost condition the information 
costs were set to 8 %. Accordingly, well-calibrated compensatory decision strategies 
yielded a higher payoff than TTB in the low cost condition, whereas in the high cost 
condition TTB yielded the highest payoff (see Table 3). Participants were informed that 
the end balance in Penunzen would be converted to real money at a rate of 100 
Penunzen = 0.01 Euro. This information was additionally displayed on the screen 
 Toolbox or spanner - A critical comparison 
35 
during all calibration and test phase trials. The participants received their reward 
according to their performance immediately after the experiment. 
The 90 calibration phase trials were identical to the ones employed in Experiments 
1 and 2, but the test phase trials were adjusted to allow for a systematic manipulation of 
the second factor of interest, the validity of hidden information. To sustain a 
manageable number of test trials, we employed different numbers of trials per 
combination, resulting in 94 test trials of interest for further analyses, and added in sum 
20 distractors. Therefore, each test phase consisted of 57 trials, leading to 114 test phase 
trials in sum. 
5.1.2 Participants  
Sixty students of the University of Mannheim (55 female, mean age 20.9) took part in 
this experiment. They received course credit for their participation and were rewarded 
in accordance to their performance (mean reward: 6.01 Euro). 
5.2 Hypotheses 
For Experiment 3, we again tested the hypotheses depicted in Table 2. Additionally, we 
predicted that the second within-subject factor validity of hidden information should 
also influence the stopping behavior. In particular, a higher validity of hidden 
information should lower the probability of immediate stopping. The information cost 
manipulation should lead to more noncompensatory decision making (TTB) in the high 
cost condition than in the low cost condition. This difference in strategy usage should be 
mirrored in lower evidence thresholds in the high cost condition than in the low cost 
condition.  
5.3 Results and discussion 
5.3.1 Strategy classification 
As for Experiments 1 and 2, decision strategies were classified with the outcome-based 
classification method (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b; Bröder, 2010) on the basis of the 
calibration phase data. In the high information cost condition, we classified 19 
participants to have most probably adhered to TTB and eleven participants were 
classified as users of a compensatory strategy. In line with our hypothesis, we found 
more users of a compensatory strategy (16 participants) and less TTB consistent 
participants (14 participants) in the low information cost condition. However, this 
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descriptive difference was only marginally significant (χ²(1, N = 60) = 1.68, p = .097, 
directional test). Nevertheless, we included the between subjects factor information cost 
condition in the further analyses to illustrate the basic idea that a factor (i.e., information 
costs) influencing the distribution between TTB and compensatory decision strategies 
should also impact the mean estimated evidence accumulation threshold as MSMs and 
EAMs mimic each other. 
5.3.2 Stop of information search 
For Hypotheses 1.a to 1.c we analyzed the dichotomous dependent variable whether 
information search was immediately abandoned when a certain level of evidence was 
presented. Figure 6 shows the mean percentage of immediate stopping across all 
participants and additionally for the sub-groups TTB and COMP participants.  
 
Figure 6: Percentage of immediate stopping of information search in Experiment 3 
(error bars represent standard errors). 
Testing Hypothesis 1.a on the group level of all participants, we found a significant 
effect of the within-subject factor levels of given evidence (F(3.25, 191.66) = 61.62, p < 
.001, η² = .51) on the stopping behavior. The significant linear trend (F(1, 59) = 117.77, 
p < .001, η² = .67) indicated that with increasing levels of given evidence the percentage 
of immediate stopping also increased. This finding was predicted by the EAM view. 
Based on the strategy classification results of the calibration phase data, we analyzed 
TTB participants and COMP participants separately for Hypothesis 1.b. For both sub-
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groups we observed the effect predicted by EAMs (TTB: F(2.85, 91.20) = 20.01, p < 
.001, η² = .39; COMP: F(3.58, 93.11) = 57.86, p < .001, η² = .69): With increasing 
levels of given evidence an increase in the percentage of immediate stopping was 
associated (linear contrast TTB: F(1, 32) = 35.21, p < .001, η² = .52; linear contrast 
COMP: F(1, 26) = 141.64, p < .001, η² = .85). Except for the highest level of given 
evidence (level 8), the mean percentage of immediate stopping on each level was higher 
for TTB participants than for COMP participants (independent samples one-sided t-
tests: all p’s ≤ .001; for level 8: p = .121). 
Hypothesis 1.c referred to the individual stopping behavior of the participants. 
Running a binary logistic regression for each participant, we found a significant positive 
slope parameter (Wald-test, p < .05) for 44 of our 60 participants. Thus, these 73 % of 
our participants showed stopping behavior that was well in line with the EAM 
prediction, but deviated from the MSM prediction. For 15 participants (25 %) we found 
a slope that did not significantly differ from zero. This pattern complied with the MSM 
prediction, but could also be interpreted as EAM-consistent with a very high or very 
low evidence threshold (cf. Experiment 1). For one participant we found a significant 
negative slope parameter – a finding that is neither predicted by EAMs nor by MSMs.  
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Figure 7: Individual estimated logistic functions for TTB (left part) and COMP (right 
part) participants in line with EAMs (upper part) or MSMs (lower part) in Experiment 
3. 
Note: For TTB and COMP participants compatible with EAMs (upper part) the mean 
estimated evidence threshold is displayed. 
Figure 7 shows the individual estimated logistic functions. Estimating the individual 
evidence thresholds for the 44 participants that were best described by the EAM 
prediction, we found that the mean estimated threshold was lower for TTB participants 
(3.36) than for COMP participants (5.80; one-sided t(33.94) = 2.87, p = .004).  
In Experiment 3, we manipulated information costs between subjects. For the 
strategy classification in the high cost condition we found descriptively more TTB-
consistent and fewer COMP-consistent participants than in the low cost condition. 
Comparing the individual estimated evidence thresholds for the participants that had a 
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significant positive slope parameter in the binary logistic regression (Wald-test: p < 
.05), we found a significantly lower evidence threshold for the high cost condition 
(3.64) than for the low cost condition (5.63; one-sided t(42) = 2.32, p = .013). 
As discussed before, in Experiments 1 and 2 we observed a drop in the mean 
percentage of immediate stopping contingent on the validity of hidden information 
chosen in the respective experiments. Thus, in Experiment 3 we systematically 
manipulated this second factor in addition to the levels of given evidence (see Appendix 
1). As stated above, despite this different validity of hidden information for each level 
of given evidence, we replicated the basic finding that with increasing levels of given 
evidence the percentage of immediate stopping increases – on the group level as well as 
on the sub-group levels of TTB and COMP participants. We could, however, also 
analyze the stopping behavior by running repeated measures ANOVAs separately for 
each validity of hidden information level. The resulting iso-validity-curves are depicted 
in Figure 8 (left part). For each validity of hidden information level a significant effect 
of the levels of given information on the stopping behavior was found (all p’s < .001) 
and a linear trend was observed (all p’s < .001). To assess the relevance of the second 
factor validity of hidden information, we could apply the same logic. Figure 8 (right 
part) shows the iso-level-curves. Except for levels 1 and 8, we found a significant effect 
of the validity of hidden information on the stopping behavior (all p’s ≤ .040) and a 
linear trend was observed (all p’s ≤ .043). For level 1 we had only one validity of 
hidden information level and therefore no test could be run. For level 8 we observed a 
ceiling effect as the percentage of immediate stopping was high – irrespective of the 
validity of hidden information. 
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Figure 8: Iso-validity-curves (left part) and iso-level-curves for the immediate stopping 
behavior in Experiment 3. 
Note: For the left part the levels of given evidence were coded to level 1 being the 
lowest level of evidence tested for the respective validity of hidden information level, 
level 2 being the second lowest level of evidence tested for the respective validity of 
hidden information level and so on. For the right part the validity of hidden information 
was coded in the same way. 
To summarize: The important effect of level of given evidence as predicted by 
EAMs was observed at each single level of the second factor (validity of hidden 
information). Furthermore, the latter factor had an effect at almost all levels of given 
evidence if these were held constant. 
5.3.3 Further information search 
The information search behavior could further be analyzed by concentrating on trials 
where participants chose to purchase at least one further piece of information. To test 
Hypothesis 2, we compared trials of the same level of evidence (and with equal validity 
of hidden information) that differed in respect to their compatibility with the initially 
open information. Two trials for each level were pre-selected to constitute the 
incompatible trials and two further pre-selected trials formed the compatible trials. 
Table 8 displays the mean number of additionally purchased cues. 
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Table 8: Mean number of additionally purchased cues in case of no immediate stopping 
in Experiment 3. 
 
Mean number of additionally purchased cues (N) 
  level 1 level 2 level 3 level 4 level 5 level 6 level 7 level 8 all 
incompatible 2.43 (70) 2.31 (74) 2.22 (81) 2.40 (65) 2.16 (55) 2.06 (53) 1.67 (39) 1.54 (24) 2.18 (461) 
compatible 1.05 (75) 1.08 (77) 1.13 (85) 1.14 (59) 1.07 (59) 1.08 (53) 1.06 (32) 1.11 (28) 1.09 (468) 
 
Running a repeated measures ANOVA, we found a significant effect of the factor 
compatibility (F(1, 53) = 126.76, p < .001; η² = .71): After purchasing one piece of 
information, participants purchased more information when incompatible information 
was found than when the information was compatible with the initially open 
information. This finding was confirmed for each level of given information by running 
independent samples t-tests (all p’s ≤ .014, directional tests). 
5.3.4 Discussion 
In Experiment 3, we were able to replicate the systematic effect of the levels of given 
evidence on the stopping behavior that was shown in Experiments 1 and 2, despite the 
additional manipulation of a second factor (validity of hidden information). These 
findings unanimously favored the EAM stopping prediction over the MSM prediction.  
The adequacy of the employed paradigm was tested by imposing different levels of 
information costs. If the frameworks (MSMs and EAMs) actually mimic each other and 
our paradigm allows for valid threshold estimation, a variable influencing the decision 
strategy distribution (MSM view) should also influence the height of the evidence 
accumulation threshold (EAM). Although the influence of this manipulation was only 
descriptively observable in the decision strategy classification, it was mirrored in the 
estimated evidence accumulation thresholds.  
In addition to the levels of given evidence, we manipulated a second factor in 
Experiment 3 that descriptively influenced the stopping behavior of the participants in 
Experiments 1 and 2. This validity of hidden information factor captured how much 
value (in our experiments in terms of validity and discrimination rate) a participant 
could receive when continuing information acquisition. Our analyses showed that this 
factor actually systematically influenced the stopping behavior: The more valuable the 
hidden information was, the higher was the probability that information acquisition 
continued. 
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6 Summary and General Discussion 
In multi-attribute decision making two frameworks coexist that make considerably 
different assumptions about the process underlying people’s adaptation to different 
environments. Multiple-strategy models (MSMs) assume that people choose from a 
toolbox of different decision strategies the one that fits best to the current problem. 
Single-process models (SPMs), however, hold that people employ the same uniform 
mechanism and merely adapt its parameters. For example, evidence accumulation 
models (EAMs), a class of SPMs that makes distinct assumptions about the process of 
information acquisition, assume that decision makers sample information until the 
accumulated evidence reaches the proposed evidence accumulation threshold whose 
height can be adapted to different environments.  
In the present paper, we aimed to contrast these two frameworks by concentrating on 
their basic assumptions about the information acquisition stopping behavior. We 
introduced a novel paradigm that allowed us to contrast MSMs’ and EAMs’ predictions 
by systematically varying the levels of given evidence in a half-open-half-closed 
information board. We found in each of our three experiments that the observed 
stopping behavior was well described by the EAM prediction, but for most participants 
did not comply with the MSM prediction. In particular, we discovered the following: (1) 
On the group level, the probability of immediate stopping increased with increasing 
levels of given evidence – a finding, that also held when participants classified as TTB 
users and compensatory strategy users were analyzed separately. (2) For the majority of 
our participants the individual stopping behavior was well captured by assuming an 
individual evidence threshold; only a minority of participants showed no significant 
increase of the probability of immediate stopping with increasing levels of given 
evidence. Importantly, this minority did not necessarily contradict the EAM prediction: 
Although their stopping behavior could be interpreted as confirming to one of the 
investigated decision strategies (TTB or a compensatory strategy, MSM view), it could 
also result from a particularly high or low evidence threshold (EAM view). Hence, an 
EAM-friendly interpretation would be that all participants followed this model, but 
some thresholds were outside the observed range. Viewed from the most MSM-friendly 
perspective possible, one might argue that a minority of participants conformed to 
decision strategies (22 %, 35 %, and 25 % in Experiments 1 - 3, respectively), whereas 
the majority was best described by some EAM model. (3) Confirming the results of our 
work within a different paradigm (Söllner et al., 2014), we found that the compatibility 
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of additionally purchased information with the initially displayed information 
influenced the subsequent stopping behavior – a finding that neither TTB nor 
compensatory decision strategies would predict.  
The work presented herein tackled two potentially critical issues relating to our 
previous work (Söllner et al., 2014): (1) possible demand effects and (2) the 
concentration on TTB-consistent behavior. Regarding the first issue, no incompatible 
information was “forced” upon the participants by displaying it for free (cf. Söllner et 
al., 2014) in the three experiments presented herein. Instead, participants could 
intentionally purchase additional information. Therefore, demand effects cannot account 
for our EAM-consistent finding that participants adapt their information search to the 
compatibility of this additional information. To account for the second issue, we based 
our MSM predictions on all the routinely investigated decision strategies (TTB and 
compensatory ones). Thus, the reported EAM-consistent findings do not rely on a 
strategy-specific induction procedure and are based on the whole sample of participants. 
Employing our novel paradigm, we found further support that the content 
(compatibility) of additional information is not irrelevant for the termination of 
information search (MSM prediction), but systematically affects subsequent behavior as 
predicted by EAMs. This finding holds for intruding information (Söllner et al., 2014), 
but also for intentionally purchased information (present work).  
The adequacy of our approach is supported by its capability to reproduce the 
aforementioned mimicking relationship between the two frameworks: (1) In each of the 
three reported experiments, we found a higher mean percentage of immediate stopping 
for participants classified as TTB users than for compensatory strategy (COMP) users. 
(2) Concentrating on participants that showed a significant increase in their stopping 
behavior across the levels of given evidence (confirming the EAM prediction), we 
observed a lower mean estimated threshold for participants classified as TTB users than 
for COMP users in all three reported experiments. (3) In Experiment 3, we showed that 
an information cost manipulation causing a descriptive shift in the strategy classification 
(MSM) was mirrored in a statistically significant difference in the mean estimated 
evidence thresholds between the two information cost conditions. Note that these 
findings are not trivial as the decision strategy classification was based on the 
calibration phase data, whereas the stopping behavior observation and the subsequent 
threshold estimation relied on the test phase data of the participants.  
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Proponents of the MSM could argue that the concentration on TTB and 
compensatory decision strategies (e.g., WADD and EQW) in our approach might be 
common practice (e.g., Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Bröder 
& Schiffer, 2003b, 2006a, 2006b; Dieckmann et al., 2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1999; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell & Lee, 2011; Rieskamp, 2006; Rieskamp & Otto, 
2006), but does not do justice to the complexity of the MSM framework. The adaptive 
toolbox (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), for example, includes further heuristics (e.g., 
“Take Two” heuristic, Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007) and stopping rules (cf. 
Gigerenzer et al., 2012) that have not been addressed in our considerations. However, 
we argue that our findings concerning the immediate stopping behavior in our paradigm 
cannot be accounted for by any of these: A stopping rule that relies on the mere number 
(m) of uncovered cues, would predict uniform stopping behavior across all levels 
(immediate stopping for m ≤ 3, continued acquisition for m > 3). Heuristics with a 
stopping rule that relates to the number of reasons (n) in favor of one option (i.e., 
compatible discriminating cues) might, however, be more successful candidates. As the 
paradigm was tailored to have TTB (n = 1) give uniform predictions and no level openly 
displayed more than two reasons (forcing all stopping rules with n > 2 to predict 
continued acquisition for all levels), the Take Two heuristic (n = 2) deserves a closer 
look: This heuristic would indeed predict continued information acquisition for levels 1 
to 3 and immediate stopping for levels 4 to 8. In contrast to this prediction, we (1) 
observed a wide range of individual evidence thresholds in all reported experiments and 
(2) still found the reported effect of the levels of given evidence on the immediate 
stopping behavior when including only levels 4 to 8 in the analyses10. 
Another potential criticism could relate to our deterministic interpretation of the 
decision strategies’ stopping rules. Of course, we agree that a probabilistic stopping rule 
that allows for random errors might give a more realistic view on human decision 
making. However, our findings are not invalidated by such an extension of the MSM 
view as a probabilistic stopping rule should merely result in random errors around the 
                                                 
10 For example, reanalyses for Hypothesis 1.a (group level) yielded the following results: Experiment 1: 
F(2.52, 156.48) = 88.09, p < .001, η² = .59; linear trend: F(1, 62) = 161.69, p < .001, η² = .72; 
Experiment 2: F(2.10, 129.93) = 52.50, p < .001, η² = .46; linear trend: F(1, 62) = 73.97, p < .001, η² = 
.54; Experiment 3: F(2.10, 124.09) = 62.63, p < .001, η² = .52; linear trend: F(1, 59) = 103.12, p < .001, 
η² = .64. 
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predicted flat slope. In particular, the repeatedly observed strong linear increase in the 
immediate stopping behavior cannot be explained by assuming probabilistic rather than 
deterministic stopping for the decision strategies. 
Finally, we base our considerations on two essential, but potentially critical 
assumptions: We assume that participants do not switch strategies (1) between 
calibration and test phases and (2) within the test phases in accordance to the different 
information patterns. We deem the first assumption plausible for several reasons: 
During the test phases, participants did not receive feedback on their choices that could 
teach them how to adjust their behavior (cf. Newell & Lee, 2009). Moreover, previous 
work has reported routine effects in decision strategy use (cf. Bröder & Schiffer, 2006a; 
Rieskamp, 2006) – even when feedback was given. Also, we explicitly (and veridically) 
told participants in the instructions that calibration and test phases were similar to each 
other, except for only two modifications – the absence of choice feedback and the 
circumstance that already three cues had been opened. Finally, we actually observed the 
expected mimicking relationship between strategy use (MSM view, determined based 
on calibration phase data) and estimated evidence thresholds (EAM view, based on test 
phase data) that builds on the assumption that participants do not switch strategies 
between calibration and test phases.  
The second assumption, that participants do not switch decision strategies contingent 
on the specific information pattern encountered, is even more crucial for our 
conclusions. We discussed this potential objection before (cf. Söllner et al., 2014) and 
remain confident that questioning this assumption is neither supported by previous work 
on strategy classification (e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b; Glöckner, 2009; Payne et al., 
1993) and routine effects (Bröder & Schiffer, 2006a; Rieskamp, 2006) nor by the basic 
idea of a “strategy” as an ordered set of processes to solve a task. 
To conclude, the reported experiments demonstrate that participants’ stopping 
behavior in multi-attribute decision tasks is influenced by two factors: (1) the value of 
the uninspected cues (validity of hidden information) and (2) the levels of given 
evidence. The effect of the validity of hidden information (1) on the stopping behavior 
emerged across the three experiments as an unexpected byproduct of our main interest 
in the levels of given information. It seems that the participants consider not only the 
information costs attached to a cue, but the value (in terms of validity and 
discrimination rate) they gain by investing these costs. Thus, their stopping behavior 
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seems to depend on cost-benefit-considerations that include several factors. To our 
knowledge, no EAM or MSM exists, that models stopping behavior accordingly. 
Indeed, stopping behavior regularly depends on the so-far sampled information, but not 
on the potentially further available information. Busemeyer and Rapoport (1988) 
discuss an optimal stopping rule and a (“myopic”) stopping rule that require planning 
several steps (i.e., m cues) ahead to determine whether “the expected loss [or gain] of 
making a terminal decision on the basis of the current information is less [or more] than 
the expected loss [or gain] of making a terminal decision after purchasing at most m 
more observations” (p. 117; brackets added). Although, for example, Gigerenzer and 
Todd (1999, p. 10) reject this “optimization under constraints” for being 
computationally intractable and therefore “demonic”, our results show that participants 
actually employ a rather complex stopping rule. Therefore, we believe that future 
research should focus on how this can be done – instead of assuming that it cannot be 
done.  
The main finding from our experiments, however, is that the levels of given evidence 
consistently affect the stopping behavior in a multi-attribute decision task. The 
unanimous findings clearly favor the EAM prediction over the MSM prediction. We are 
not aware of any decision strategy that would predict these highly systematic findings 
that are clearly in line with a basic prediction of EAMs. Of course, the MSM framework 
could potentially include an “evidence-accumulation” decision strategy that can account 
for our findings as the set of decision strategies is theoretically not restricted (e.g., 
Glöckner & Betsch, 2011; Newell & Lee, 2011; Newell, 2005, but see Marewski, 
2010). However, we believe that such absorption of additional decision strategies that 
are able to account for certain empirical findings is not warranted as it results in an 
untestable and therefore invulnerable framework (Glöckner & Betsch, 2011). Instead, 
we advocate to noncommittedly investigate which framework’s metaphor describes 
decision making best. The results presented in this article clearly favor the evidence 
accumulation models’ adjustable spanner metaphor over the toolbox metaphor of the 
multiple-strategy models.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Levels of given evidence (level 1: minimum evidence; level 8: maximum 
evidence) - and validity of hidden information- manipulation in Experiment 3. 
Validity combination 1 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 
Cue 1 - - - - + -             + - + - 
Cue 2 - - + - - - 
      
- - + - 
Cue 3 + - - - - - 
      
+ - - - 
Cue 4 ? ? ? ? ? ? 
      
? ? ? ? 
Cue 5 ? ? ? ? ? ? 
      
? ? ? ? 
Cue 6 ? ? ? ? ? ? 
      
? ? ? ? 
Validity combination 2 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8 
Cue 1     - - + -         + -     + - 
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+ - - - 
    
- - 
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? ? ? ? 
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? ? 
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? ? ? ? 
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